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  1 
Over the past century, medical advancements have resulted in tremendous 
health gains for Americans.  Although the federal government has played 
a prominent role in ensuring that new treatments are safe and effective, 
questions  about  which  medical  treatments  work  best  under  which 
circumstances  have  largely  remained  unanswered.  T hus,  the  federal 
government’s  recent  major  investments  in  comparative-effectiveness 
research have potential to play a significant role helping both patients and 
health  care  providers  navigate  the  vast  array  of  available  treatment 
options, as well as to improve the quality, efficiency, and delivery health 
care system-wide.  Yet, the controversial nature of the government’s foray 
into comparative-effectiveness research also suggests that the path toward 
realizing  these  goals  may  be  treacherous.    This  paper  describes  the 
rationales for federal support of comparative-effectiveness research and 
potential models for that involvement, analyzes the federal government’s 
recent investments in the research, and concludes with predictions about 
the  probable  outcomes  of  these  investments.    While  increased  federal 
support for comparative-effectiveness research is unlikely to achieve all of 
the  benefits  anticipated  by  its  supporters,  it  is  a  crucial  step  toward 
ensuring that Americans are able to take full advantage of the benefits of 
medical innovation. 
 
 
  One of the great successes of the United States health care system has been its 
ability to encourage the development of innovative drugs, devices and treatments that 
have dramatically improved the health of Americans.  Through the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”), the federal government has played a key role in this process by 
standardizing and synthesizing information about these innovations, as well as by serving 
as a gatekeeper to ensure that only safe and effective drugs and devices enter the market.  
Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the FDA and other federal and state-level government 
entities to generate and digest information about medical innovations, this is a task that 
has so far exceeded the capacity of the government.  As a result, while a tremendous 
amount of information exists about both new and existing drugs, therapies, tests and 
devices (“treatments”), there is very little useful information available comparing the  
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costs and effectiveness of different options that are used to treat the same condition.  
Furthermore, the private and non-profit sectors have so far also failed to meet this need. 
  Nearly everyone agrees that more information comparing the effectiveness of 
different medical treatments is important for the future of the United States health care 
system.  Comparative-effectiveness research (“CER”) has the potential to improve health 
care quality and efficiency while also decreasing costs.  As with many issues in health 
policy, however, the consensus surrounding the importance of CER is limited.  
Proponents of government investment in CER have faced intense criticism about costs, 
implementation, the role of the government in health care, and the potential slippery 
slope consequences of CER.  As a result, while 2009 and 2010 were years of 
unprecedented federal investment in CER, the government’s future role in supporting and 
generating comparative-effectiveness information remains uncertain.   
  This paper addresses the questions of what role the government can and should 
play in the generation, dissemination, and use of CER.  While some of the uncertainty 
surrounding the federal government’s recent efforts derives from the political challenges 
facing the ACA as a whole, the remainder is associated with difficulties inherent to CER.  
Numerous challenges, both technical and political, will make it difficult to realize the 
potential benefits of the research in full.  Yet, even if the government’s recent initiatives 
are not entirely successful in controlling health care costs or vastly improving health care 
quality through more appropriate use of medical treatments, they represent an important 
step in the right direction.  Ultimately, the future of the United States health care system 
depends on its ability to filter medical innovations not only by their safety and efficacy,  
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but their relative value in comparison to alternatives.  Government sponsored CER has 
potential to serve an important role in accomplishing this goal.  
  Part I of this paper defines CER and describes the problems that CER seeks to 
address, as well as the arguments for and against this type of research.  Part II then briefly 
summarizes some potential models for governmental involvement in CER, and provides 
examples of how the governments of other countries have supported CER.  Part III 
details the history of governmental participation in CER, including recent investments 
made by the federal government in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (“ARRA”)
1 and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”).
2  
Lastly, part IV identifies some opportunities and challenges associated with these recent 
investments and provides policy recommendations for, and predictions about, the future 
of government involvement in CER.  Although some of the loftier expectations foisted 
upon the research by its supporters are unlikely to be realized, the federal government’s 
recent investments in CER have important potential to both generate valuable 
information for providers and consumers
3 of health care, and improve the norms and 
metrics against which medical innovations are assessed. 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
2 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, P.L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) 
(hereinafter “Reconciliation Act”).  Hereinafter, references to the ACA describe the Act 
as amended by the Reconciliation Act. 
3 Use of the phrase “health care consumers” has recently faced some criticism.  See Paul 
Krugman, Patients Are Not Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 2011, at A3.  My intent is 
to use the term in a neutral sense, that is, to describe the broad category of individuals 
and groups who consume health care services (which is not necessarily identical to the set 
of health care “patients”), but without the implication that they subscribe to any specific 
behaviors common to consumers of other goods.  It is also not my intention to downplay 
the unique characteristics of the market for health care services or the special nature of 
the physician-patient relationship.  
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I.  What is CER? 
A.  Defining CER 
  In order to define and understand CER, it is first necessary to identify the 
problems that CER has the potential to ameliorate.  Commentators both inside and 
outside of medicine have grown increasingly frustrated with the reality that less than half 
of standard medical treatments are supported by scientific evidence of effectiveness.
4  
One 2009 study, for example, found that only 11% of current guidelines issued by the 
American College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association were supported by 
the highest level of evidence (including “multiple randomized trials or meta-analyses”).
5  
In addition, many patients in the United States fail to receive care that is recommended 
on the basis of scientific evidence.
6  CER is part of a broader movement to remedy this 
problem by facilitating and encouraging the use of evidence-based medicine (“EBM”). 
  While there are a number of different ways to define CER,
7 the ACA defines 
“comparative clinical effectiveness research” as “research evaluating and comparing 
                                                 
4 JOHN DONNOLLY, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF:  COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 1 
(2010), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/70208.pdf.  Furthermore, it is 
clear that a wide variety of factors unrelated a treatment’s appropriateness influence the 
decisionmaking process of health care providers.  See, e.g., Danil V. Makarov et al., The 
Association Between Diffusion of the Surgical Robot and Radical Prostatectomy Rates, 
49 MED. CARE 333 (2011) (finding hospitals that purchased surgical robots that were 
very expensive but only of “marginal benefit” in treating prostate cancer conducted many 
more radical prostatectomies than other hospitals, suggesting the existence of “supply 
induced demand”). 
5 Pierluigi Tricoci et al., Scientific Evidence Underlying the ACC/AHA Clinical Practice 
Guildeines, 301 JAMA 831 (2009). 
6 Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the 
United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635 (2003) (reporting that only 54.9% of a 
random sample of adults surveyed in 12 metropolitan areas received recommended care.). 
7 For a chart describing how different organizations have defined CER, see COMMITTEE 
ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 44 (2009)  
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health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of [two] or more 
medical treatments, services, and items.”
8  The statute then goes on to define the relevant 
“medical treatments, services, and items” as “health care interventions, protocols for 
treatment, care management, and delivery, procedures, medical devices, diagnostic tools, 
pharmaceuticals (including drugs and biologicals), integrative health practices, and any 
other strategies or items being used in the treatment, management, and diagnosis of, or 
prevention of illness or injury in, individuals.”
9  I use the ACA definition, rather than, for 
example, the definitions created by the IOM
10 and the Federal Coordinating Council for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research
11 for the purpose of reports ordered by Congress in 
ARRA,
12 for the sake of consistency and clarity, as well as because it is the definition that 
                                                 
(hereinafter “IOM NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR CER”) (including definitions from the 
Congressional Budget Office, the American College of Physicians, the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Board, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, among 
others); see also AHRQ Effective Health Care Program, “What is Comparative 
Effectiveness Research,” http://www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/what-is-
comparative-effectiveness-research1/ (last visited March 30, 2011). 
8 ACA § 6301, to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § (a)(2). 
9 Id. 
10 IOM defines CER as “the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the 
benefits and harms of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a 
clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care.  The purpose of CER is to assist 
consumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policy makers to make informed decisions that 
will improve health care at both the individual and population levels.” IOM NATIONAL 
PRIORITIES FOR CER, supra note 7, at 41. 
11 The Council defined CER as “the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the 
benefits and harms of different interventions and strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat and 
monitor health conditions in ‘real world’ settings.  The purpose of this research is to 
improve health outcomes by developing and disseminating evidence-based information to 
patients, clinicians, and other decision-makers, responding to their expressed needs, about 
which interventions are most effective for which patients under specific circumstances.” 
FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, infra 
note 228, at 16. 
12 Id. at xv; Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, Title XIII (2009) (“the Secretary [of Health 
and Human Services] shall enter into a contract with the Institute of Medicine . . . to 
produce and submit a report to the Congress and the Secretary by not later than June 30,  
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will govern the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (“PCORI”), the federal 
agency that will coordinate the federal government’s substantial new investments in 
CER.
13   
  Generally speaking, CER is different from other forms of health research in three 
ways:  it compares at least two treatments, it analyzes “real-world outcomes” rather than 
experimental outcomes or general efficacy,
14 and the resulting information is useful for a 
number of decisionmakers, such as health care providers, consumers, and policymakers 
(as opposed to, for example, just safety regulators).
15  Although CER is useful in a 
number of contexts outside of medical treatment, such as public health
16 and health 
                                                 
2009, that includes recommendations on the national priorities for comparative 
effectiveness research to be conducted or supported with the funds provided in this 
paragraph and that considers input from stakeholders”). 
13 See infra section III(b)(2). 
14 Efficacy differs from effectiveness in that efficacy refers to “the effective of the 
treatment under optimal conditions” while effectiveness addresses the treatment’s effects 
“in routine clinical practice.”  GRETCHEN A. JACOBSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, COMPARATIVE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH:  
BACKGROUND, HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 4-5 (2007). 
15 Louis P. Garrison Jr. et al., A Flexible Approach To Evidentiary Standards for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1812, 1813 (2010). 
16 See generally, e.g., Steven M. Teutsch and Jonathan E. Fielding, Applying 
Comparative Effectiveness Research To Public and Population Health Initiatives, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 349 (2011) (advocating for the application of CER to population-level 
social and environmental determinants of health and discussing the similarities and 
differences between this type of CER and CER on individual-level medical treatments); 
Kevin G. Volpp and Anup Das, Comparative Effectiveness – Thinking beyond 
Medication A versus Medication B, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 331 (2009) (calling for CER 
that measures the effectiveness of medical treatments against behavioral and health 
system interventions); see also Alexander and Stafford, supra note 22, at 2489 (calling 
for comparisons of strategies involving patient behavior or non-physician initiated 
treatments, such as alternative therapies); McClellan and Benner, infra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 11 (calling for CER on different policies that influence 
provider adoption of different treatments).  
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system design,
17 I focus on the use of CER to study medical treatments in order to limit 
this paper to a manageable scope.  Many of the challenges, opportunities, and ideas 
discussed in this paper, however, are applicable in other contexts as well. 
b. Arguments in Against and in Favor of CER 
  Although the idea of increasing the amount of comparative information available 
for health care providers and consumers is intuitively appealing, and the broader EBM 
movement has gained popularity in recent years, proponents of CER have thus far faced 
an uphill battle.
18  First, comparative effectiveness information is not always available,
19 
and even if evidence is available, it may be inadequate to provide a complete picture 
about how a treatment works in the real world.
20  This “residual uncertainty” raises 
                                                 
17 See Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36, 44 
(“Congress has provided vital funding for research that compares the effectiveness of 
different treatments, and this should help reduce uncertainty about which treatments are 
best.  But we also need to fund research that compares the effectiveness of different 
systems of care—to reduce our uncertainty about which systems work best for 
communities.”). 
18 Dan Mendelson and Tanisha V. Carino, Evidence-Based Medicine In The United States 
– De Rigueur Or Dream Deferred?, 24 HEALTH AFF. 133, 133 (2005) (“All clinicians 
and managed care plans believe that their decisions are based on evidence . . . However . . 
. there is little evidence of EBM’s success in influencing behavior and as a well-accepted 
foundation for how patient care should be organized, delivered, and financed.”). 
19 For example, because the FDA does not regulate medical or surgical treatments, less 
information about safety and efficacy is available for those treatments in comparison to 
drugs and devices.  See Lynn M. Etheredge, A Rapid-Learning Health System, 26 
HEALTH AFF. w107, w112 (2007). 
20 Id. at w111 (noting that, particularly for drugs, it can difficult to determine the efficacy 
of a treatment based on clinical trials alone, and sometimes important safety or efficacy 
information is only available once a drug has been used by a number of patients over a 
long period of time); Norbert Gleicher, ‘Expert Panels’ Won’t Improve Health Care, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2009, at A21; Jerome Groopman and Pamela Hartzband, Why 
‘Quality’ Care Is Dangerous, WALL ST. J., April 8, 2009, at A13 (noting that sometimes 
scientific evidence about a treatment turns out to be wrong).  At the same time, there are 
costs to waiting for better information to adopt a new treatment.  See generally Kalipso 
Chalkidou et al. Evidence-Based Decision Making:  When Should We Wait For More 
Information?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1642, 1642-1644 (2008).  
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difficult questions about when scientific evidence is strong enough to alter the behavior 
of health care providers.
21 
Second, it can take a long time for new information about treatments to diffuse 
among vast networks of health care providers, if such diffusion ever occurs.
22  The 
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) estimates that it takes, on average, 17 years for physicians 
to broadly adopt a treatment found to be more effective than alternatives.
23  This issue is 
related to a number of separate problems.  A non-exhaustive list includes that the 
designers of clinical trials often fail to plan for dissemination of the studies’ results,
24 
information distributed in continuing medical education programs may be strongly 
influenced by industry biases,
25 and industry marketing typically favors the use of 
expensive products regardless of comparative effectiveness evidence.
26  Lastly, some 
health care providers may resist adopting new practices for practical
27 or cultural
28 
                                                 
21 See generally Karl Claxton et al., When Is Evidence Sufficient?, 24 HEALTH AFF. 93 
(2005). 
22 See generally Jerry Avord and Michael Fischer, ‘Bench To Behavior’:  Translating 
Comparative Effectiveness Research Into Improved Clinical Practice, 29 HEALTH AFF. 
1891 (2010) (“Vaccination against polio, the concept that mid-to-moderate hypertension 
requires treatment, the use of statins to prevent cardiovascular events, the administration 
of antibiotics near the time of surgery – all are interventions for which having clear 
evidence in the medical literature was not adequate in itself to consistently transform 
practice on a large scale.”); see also G. Caleb Alexander and Randall S. Stafford, Does 
Comparative Effectiveness Have a Comparative Edge, 301 JAMA 2488, 2488-89 (2009). 
23 ANN C. GREINER AND ELISA KNEBEL, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH PROFESSIONS 
EDUCATION:  A BRIDGE TO QUALITY, 33 (2003). 
24 Id. at 1892. 
25 Id. at 1893. 
26 Id. at 1893-1894. 
27 Id. at 1894-1985 (noting that physicians may be particularly likely resist adoption of 
revenue-decreasing new practices, but may also resist adoption due to conceptual 
objections to EBM). 
28 See Posting of Barron H. Lerner to Room for Debate Blog (N.Y. Times), Are Doctors 
Too Quick to Cut?:  Where Culture Comes In,  
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reasons, a problem exacerbated by the reality that most health care providers are not 
subject to quality controls requiring them to make use of current research.
29 
  A third and related point is that popular culture does not always praise health care 
providers who invest the time, resources and energy to adopt EBM.  An undoubtedly 
exaggerated example of this dynamic can be seen in the popular television show 
“House,” about an egocentric but brilliant physician who seems to base diagnostic and 
treatment decision on intuition, mostly to the exclusion of considerations based on 
scientific evidence, treatment guidelines, and cost.
30  While the vast majority of people 
probably would prefer that their real health care providers not exhibit the same behaviors 
as the fictional doctors they watch on television, the ideal of the renegade doctor acting 
on the basis of individual judgment and experience rather than evidence-based guidelines 
is not limited to entertainment.  Strong political opposition to EBM and CER often 
references the importance of resisting “cookbook medicine.”
31  Because, in its strongest 
form, EBM narrows the range of permissible choices available to health care providers, it 
                                                 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/09/are-doctors-too-quick-to-cut/where-
culture-comes-in (Feb. 9, 2011). 
29 GREINER, supra note 23, at 1895. 
30 See Posting of Vickie Williams to Concurring Opinions Blog, Why House is the True 
American Health Care Hero and What To Do About It, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/10/why-house-is-the-true-american-
health-care-hero-and-what-to-do-about-it.html (Oct. 12, 2010, 20:39 EST); Steven 
Pearlstein, Self-Help for the Health-Care System, WASH. POST, June 17, 2009 at A12; 
“Add It Up:  Pricing Out A Visit To TV’s ‘Dr. House,’” NPR, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127593663 (June 9, 2010). 
31 Stefan Timmermans and Aaron Mauck, The Promises And Pitfalls of Evidence-Based 
Medicine, 24 HEALTH AFF. 18, 21 (2005) (Critics of EBM tend “to see medicine in 
traditional terms:  It is a ‘craft’ or ‘art,’ in which individual expertise and technique are 
allowed to shine through and ultimately result in a higher standard of patient care. . . . 
Instead of revolutionizing care, EBM therefore threatens to bring about stagnation and 
bland uniformity, derogatorily characterized as ‘cookbook medicine.’”).    
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threatens the autonomy and discretion otherwise inherent to the work of professionals.
32  
Opponents of CER have also cited concerns that EBM has potential to limit consumer 
autonomy by undervaluing patient preferences.
33 
Another important argument against CER involves potential conflicts with the 
movement toward personalized medicine.  Personalized medicine seeks to identify how 
genetics influence the different levels of effectiveness experienced by subpopulations for 
a single treatment.
34  Opponents believe that CER will result in one-size-fits-all medicine 
that inhibits the growth of a more granulated approach to patient care.  A related concern 
is that once researchers have generated CER, the research will be applied equally to 
treatments and patients for which it is appropriate and inappropriate.
35   
  EBM and CER have also faced opposition due to concerns about their 
implications for health care “rationing.”  Although health care is a scarce resource and 
some form of rationing is inevitable,
36 critics of CER have expressed concern that the 
research will be used to deny insurance coverage for treatments on the basis of cost-
                                                 
32 Id. at 23. 
33 DOCTEUR AND BERENSON, infra n. 57 at 9.   
34 Robert Epstein and J. Russell Teagarden, Comparative Effectiveness And Personalized 
Medicine:  Evolving Together Or Apart?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1783, 1784 (2010); Alan M. 
Garber and Sean R. Tunis, Does Comparative-Effectiveness Research Threaten 
Personalized Medicine?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1925, 1925 (2010). 
35 Jerome Groopman, Health Care:  Who Knows ‘Best’?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 11, 
2010 (noting that some treatments can be standardized, and other treatments must be 
tailored to the circumstances of individual patients). 
36 See David O. Meltzer and Allan S. Detsky, The Real Meaning of Rationing, 304 JAMA 
2292, 2293 (2010) (distinguishing health care rationing from other forms of government 
rationing because individuals are free to purchase any legal health care services; 
“rationing” in health care generally refers to whether insurance will pay for a particular 
service); Doyle McManus, Healthcare has Rationing in Abundance, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
2009, at A38.  
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benefit analysis.
37  In particular, critics have compared CER efforts in the United States 
to the British National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (“NICE”),
38 an agency 
that both compiles scientific and cost-effectiveness evidence about medical treatments 
and makes coverage recommendations to the country’s National Health Services 
(“NHS”).
39  This political argument against CER is likely augmented by the reality that 
EBM is not a well-understood concept among the public, and the general population may 
have some unrealistic beliefs about physician adoption of scientific research and other 
issues related to health care quality.
40 
Even if the rationing consequences of CER are less severe than the explicit 
rationing that occurs in the NHS, observers have noted that the mistakes and biases to 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, ObamaCare Is All About Rationing, WALL ST. J., August 
18, 2009, at A15 (“Comparative effectiveness could become the vehicle for deciding 
whether each method of treatment provides enough of an improvement in health care to 
justify its cost.”); see also Fox, infra note 350, at 31 (noting that “[g]iven current 
problems with hidden rationing in Medicare, CER results are at risk of being distorted 
[and] relied upon as scientific support for what are, in truth, political and societal 
decisions about healthcare rationing.”).  
38 Of NICE and Men, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2009, at A14; Sen. Tom Coburn, The Health 
Bill Is Scary, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at A27 (“CER panels have been used as 
rationing commissions in other countries such as the U.K., where 15,000 cancer patients 
die prematurely every year . . . CER panels here could effectively dictate coverage 
options and ration care”). 
39 See generally “About NICE,” http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/ (last visited March 
30, 2011); Nicholas Timmins, The NICE Way Of Influencing Health Spending:  A 
Conversation With Sir Michael Rawlins, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1360 (2009) (noting that the 
overall effect of NICE has been to NHS spending because it usually approves the drugs 
and treatments that it reviews); Barry Meier, New Effort Reopens a Medical Minefield, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at B1; see also infra notes 131-138, and accompanying text. 
40 Kristin L. Carman et al., Evidence That Consumers Are Skeptical About Evidence-
Based Health Care, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1400 (2010) (finding that health care consumers 
tend to believe that newer and costlier care is of higher quality, more care is better care, 
also noting that “[t]o the extent that consumers perceive that the application of 
comparative effectiveness research to decision making could limit their choice of 
providers, inappropriately interfere with physicians’ recommendations for treatment, or 
appear to ‘ration’ care based on cost, these efforts will encounter consumer resistance and 
could lead to a broad consumer backlash.”).  
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which all research, including CER, is prone can have particularly harmful consequences 
when providers are incentivized or coerced into implementing the findings of relatively 
new research.
41  This is not a trivial concern.  Scientific evidence, in medicine or 
otherwise, is far from absolute, and the history of medicine is replete with examples 
where new evidence has reversed recommendations about formerly well-accepted 
treatments.
42  To the extent that aggressive CER promotion results in more rapid adoption 
of new or different treatments, it has potential to increase the harm that occurs when later 
research discovers unanticipated side effects or effectiveness problems. 
A related concern is that EBM inherently favors existing treatments, which have 
had time to be studied, over new treatments, fostering a sort of status quo bias against 
medical innovation in the scope of regular patient care.
43  The counter to this argument is 
that even outside of formal research, medical innovation and the testing of new 
                                                 
41 Groopman, supra n. 35 (noting that researchers are susceptible to (1) falling “in love” 
with their own research, (2) “confirmation bias,” and (3) “focusing illusion,” i.e. 
predicting exaggerated and unrealistic results). 
42 See Groopman and Pamela, supra note 20; Groopman, supra note 35 (“For example, 
Medicare specified that it was a ‘best practice’ to tightly control blood sugar levels in 
critically ill patients in intensive care.  That measure of quality was not only shown to be 
wrong but resulted in a higher likelihood of death when compared to measures allowing a 
more flexible treatment and higher blood sugar.”); see also Gail Collins, Medicine on the 
Move, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2011, at A27 (“We got word this week that estrogen therapy, 
which was bad, is good again.  Possibly.  In some cases. This was not quite as confusing 
as the news last year that calcium supplements, which used to be very good, are now 
possibly bad.  Although maybe not.  And the jury’s still out. . . . We certainly want 
everyone to keep doing studies.  But it’s very difficult to be a civilian in the world of 
science.”). 
43 See Patrick L. Taylor, Overseeing Innovative Therapy without Mistaking It for 
Research:  A Function-Based Model Based on Old Truths, New Capacities, and Lessons 
from Stem Cells, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 301 (2010) (“Together with evidence-
based approaches and payer insistence on limiting treatment to accepted practice, the 
current environment encourages a defensive crouch:  it is safer to avoid innovative 
therapy and take refuge in the sanctuary of ‘tried and true,’ where data in sufficient 
quantity can be shown to payers.  Taken too far, that will be the death knell of innovative 
therapy.”).  
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treatments should be systematic and purposeful, rather than a post-hoc justification for 
the default position when scientific evidence about an existing treatment does not exist, 
or existing research is not widely disseminated.  Regardless, if EMB and CER result in a 
medical culture fearful of innovative treatments applied in a non-research setting, they 
could hinder the development of new therapies. 
Because of the possibility that CER will result in insurers refusing to cover 
treatments deemed to be comparatively ineffective, some members of medical treatment 
industries have also opposed CER.
44  Beyond the argument that CER is problematic 
simply because it has potential to decrease revenue for these industries, critics have 
claimed that CER will limit health care innovation because it makes investment in 
innovation more risky.
45  Furthermore, to the extent that CER favors treatments that have 
                                                 
44 See Jerry Avorn, Debate about Funding Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927, 1928 (2009); Post of Uwe E. Reinhardt to N.Y. Times 
Economix Blog, ‘Cost-Effectiveness Analysis’ and U.S. Health Care, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/cost-effectiveness-analysis-and-us-
health-care/ (March 13, 2009, 06:45 EST); Post of Sarah Rubenstein to Wall Street 
Journal Health Blog, Drug Makers Talk Up Comparative Effectiveness, Sort Of, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/04/14/drug-makers-talk-up-comparative-effectiveness-
sort-of/?KEYWORDS=comparative+effectiveness+research (April 14, 2009, 08:51 EST) 
(noting that industry support for CER is limited to the extent that the research is not used 
to deny insurance coverage for specific treatments). 
45 DOCTEUR AND BERENSON, infra note 56, at 9; Diane Suchetka, Cleveland Clinic CEO 
Toby Cosgrove Talks About Health-Care Reform And More At City Club, Cleveland 
Plain Dealer, Aug. 19, 2010 (“’My concern is that we only pay for [treatments proven 
effective by CER], we begin to limit what people are willing to do in terms of developing 
new products’ [said Cleveland Clinic CEO Toby Cosgrove] . . . ‘Right now, a new heart 
valve takes 10 years to go from concept to clinical.  And it takes 10 years more to know if 
it’s better than the next heart valve.  Now, if I was an investor or if I was a manufacturer, 
would I be interested in essentially putting my dollars down not knowing whether I’m 
going to get a return on those dollars for 20 years?  I think that’s a stretch.’”), available at 
http://www.cleveland.com/healthfit/index.ssf/2010/08/cleveland_clinic_ceo_toby_cosg.ht
ml.  Of course, the problem with this argument is its lack of obvious boundaries.  In 
theory, for example, looser FDA efficacy or safety standards would also increase 
investment in innovation, by decreasing the risk that an expensive innovation would be  
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already been the subject scientific evaluation, CER could also favor newer, more high-
technology treatments over low-technology treatments, such as generic drugs, old 
treatments or improvements in health care delivery that researchers have not rigorously 
studied.
46 
Proponents of CER, in contrast, have pointed to a number of important benefits 
that could spring from more CER.  In addition to the benefits inherent to having more 
scientific information available to health care providers and consumers, such as improved 
and more transparent competition in the health care industry
47 and fewer geographic 
disparities in the use of health care treatments,
48 proponents have noted that CER has 
potential to decrease health care costs while improving quality, for example, by reducing 
waste in the health care system.
49 
                                                 
excluded from the market.  It is far from obvious that we should discourage health care 
providers and patients from using the most effective treatments simply in order to 
increase the incentives for medical innovations because, as with safety and non-
comparative effectiveness, there are countervailing policy considerations.  Furthermore, 
in countries whose governments support CER, there is no empirical evidence suggesting 
that those efforts have hindered innovation. Chalkidou, infra note 127, at 362-363. 
46 ELIZABETH DOCTEUR AND ROBERT BERENSON, infra n. 56 at 9. 
47 See Wilensky, infra note 83, at w572 - w573. 
48 See generally Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, www.dartmouthatlast.org (last visited 
March 29, 2011); see also 2007 CBO REPORT, infra note 84, at 12-15 (describing the 
results and implications of the Dartmouth Atlas project).  
49 See generally Ari Hoffman and Steven D. Pearson, ‘Marginal Medicine’:  Targeting 
Comparative Effectiveness Research To Reduce Waste, 28 HEALTH AFF. w710 (2009) 
(describing four categories of “waste,” or “marginal medicine,” for which CER might be 
helpful:  “inadequate evidence of comparative net benefit for any indication,” “use 
beyond the boundaries of established not benefit,” “higher cost when established benefit 
is comparable to other options,” and “relatively high cost for incremental benefit 
compared to other options”); see e.g. Adam G. Elshaug and Alan M Garber, How CER 
Could Pay for Itself – Insights from Vertebral Fracture Treatments, 364 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1390 (2011); but see Rand Health Compare, Analysis of Comparative 
Effectiveness, http://www.randcompare.org/analysis-of-options/analysis-of-comparative-
effectiveness (last visited March 30, 2011) (noting that “under some circumstances, using  
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In recent decades, health care costs in the United States have far outpaced overall 
inflation.
50  Although all developed countries have struggled with cost control issues to 
some extent,
51 American per capita health care costs remain the highest in the world.
52  
As a consequence of the high cost of health care in the United States, many Americans 
lack health insurance.
53  Moreover, the United States’ aggregate health statistics are 
mediocre relative to those of other developed countries,
54 suggesting that Americans do 
not get good value for their health care dollars.
55  Thus, it is clear that there is room for 
both cost cutting and quality improvement in the United States health care system, and to 
the extent that CER is capable of contributing to these goals without causing problems 
                                                 
comparative effectiveness research might reduce overall spending, but there is no clear 
evidence on the direction or magnitude of the relationship”). 
50 See generally The Economic Case for Health Reform:  Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. 
on the Budget, 111th Cong. (2009); BOB LYKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
HEALTH CARE REFORM:  AN INTRODUCTION, 4 (2009).  
51 See Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending In The United States And The Rest Of 
The Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 906 (2005) (noting that “[i]n every 
[OECD] country, growth in health spending outpaced inflation during the period 1992-
2002,” but even though this was a period of relatively stable health care spending in the 
United States, “health spending as a percentage of [gross domestic product] increased by 
1.6 percentage points . . . twice the OECD median”).  OECD stands for the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, which is a group composed of high-income 
countries.  See “Members and Partners,” 
http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_36734052_36761800_36999961_1_1_1_1,
00.html (last visited March 30, 2011). 
52 CHRIS L. PETERSON AND RACHEL BURTON, REPORT FOR CONGRESS:  U.S. HEALTH 
CARE SPENDING:  COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES (2007). 
53 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE UNINSURED AND THE DIFFERENCE HEALTH 
INSURANCE MAKES (2010), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-12.pdf. 
54 See Peter A. Muennig and Sherry A. Glied, What Changes in Survival Rates Tell Us 
About U.S. Health Care, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2105 (2010).   
55 See Michael B. Rothberg et al., Little Evidence of Correlation Between Growth In 
Health Care Spending And Reduced Mortality, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1523 (2010) (finding 
“inconsistent value” associated with health care spending, with areas of good value “as 
well as areas of apparent waste, where money might be better spent on research to find 
more-effective therapies.”).      
  16 
that outweigh its benefits, it could be an important (and relatively pain free)
56 component 
of any plan to reform the health care system.   
Underlying claims about the potential cost benefits of CER, however, is the 
assumption that less expensive treatments will be found to be at least as effective as more 
expensive treatments.
57  Although there is nothing inherent to CER that requires this to be 
accurate, past experience suggests that it may be a reasonable assumption.
58  Even if CER 
does justify the use of less expensive treatments, however, cost savings will only result if 
consumers and providers actually alter their behaviors in favor of the lower cost and more 
effective treatments, an outcome that is not supported by past experience.
59 
Some proponents of CER have also argued that better information about the 
comparative effectiveness of different treatments will help, rather than hinder, efforts to 
deliver increasingly personalized medicine to patients.  Withholding information from 
health care providers about the effectiveness of possible treatments certainly does not 
make it easier to tailor a treatment to a given patient’s individual circumstances.
60  In 
addition to identifying which treatments are more effective on average, researchers can 
use CER to identify genetic or environmental subpopulations for which personalized 
                                                 
56 Although CER is controversial, the fact that significant investments in CER managed 
to pass Congress twice in two years suggests that this controversy pales into comparison 
to any serious effort to enact more stringent methods of cost control. 
57 ELIZABETH DOCTEUR AND ROBERT BERENSON, HOW WILL COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AFFECT THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE?, 8 (2010), available 
at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/20100218qscomparativeeffectiveness.pdf.   
58 Id. (citing studies that found newer hypertension and anti-psychotic drugs to be no 
more effective than older, less expensive drugs). 
59 Id. 
60 Garber, supra n. 34, at 1926 (“[W]ith too few appropriately designed studies, 
physicians, patients, and families often had little guidance about which patients were 
most likely to benefit from a clinical strategy.  Perhaps the most important goal of CER is 
to broaden and deepen such information, providing tools for matching medical care much 
more precisely to individual patients.”).  
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medicine is suitable or new applications for personalized medicine.
61  Beyond 
personalizing treatments for individual patients, CER also has potential to help providers 
recommend the best treatment for each unique instance or variation of a given disease.
62  
Most importantly, however, CER might be necessary to prove the relative effectiveness 
of personalized medicine itself in order to encourage broader adoption among skeptical 
health care providers.
63 
Lastly, even if CER is a blunt and imperfect tool, much criticism of CER seem to 
imply that health care resources are not scarce, and the choice not to adopt CER-based 
guidelines or insurance coverage rules is free.  This is clearly not the case.  Despite the 
United States’ remarkably high level of health care spending, roughly fifty million people 
in the United States remain uninsured.
64  Holding this figure constant, and assuming the 
                                                 
61 Epstein and Teagarden, supra n. 34, at 1784; C. Daniel Mullins et al., The Potential 
Impact Of Comparative Effectiveness Research On The Health Of Minority Population, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 2098, 2100 (2010) (“Ideally, comparative effectiveness research should 
lead to the opposite of ‘one size fits all’ treatment by producing evidence and insights 
that are applicable to subgroups of patients.”).; see Meier, supra note 39 (“’Ironically, the 
motivation for comparative effectiveness is to see what works in practice,’ [said Dr. Mark 
Helfand, director of the Oregon Evidence-based Practice Center,] ‘rather than 
overgeneralizing from a few unrepresentative studies.’”). 
62 Posting of Pauline Chen to Room for Debate Blog (N.Y. Times), Are Doctors Too 
Quick to Cut?:  Variations and Exceptions, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/09/are-doctors-too-quick-to-
cut/variations-and-exceptions-in-approaches-to-disease (Feb. 9, 2011, 19:49 EST).  This 
argument changed the mind of at least one group of stakeholders, cancer groups, during 
the debate about CER in the ACA.  See Iglehart, infra note 222, at 1759. 
63 Id. at 1785 (“There is . . .  a paucity of comparative effectiveness data showing the 
value of personalized medicine.  We know from the published literature that genetics can 
contribute to our understanding of drug response for many commonly used medications . 
. . Yet routine use of these genetic tests is not supported by many physician specialty 
organizations, nor is it covered by government or other insurers, because data are 
lacking.”); MARK MCCLELLAN AND JOSHUA BENNER, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS 
RESEARCH:  WILL IT BEND THE HEALTH CARE COST CURVE AND IMPROVE QUALITY?, 8 
(2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2009/0609_health_care_cer.aspx. 
64 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra n. 53.  
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federal government ultimately implements the ACA without significant changes and the 
projection that the law will reduce the number of uninsured Americans by 32 million is 
accurate, there will remain at least 23 million uninsured residents in the United States.
 65  
While these people are likely to have access to some health care, health insurance status 
has a significant impact on access to health care; the uninsured often lack regular access 
to health care services, and they are more likely to delay or forgo necessary health care 
than the insured.
66  Thus, to the extent that the imperfection of CER inhibits its use and 
results in value-less health expenditures, fewer health care resources may be available to 
assist underserved populations like the uninsured.   
Even if the money saved by people with private insurance through use of CER is 
not diverted toward underserved populations, there is another subpopulation for which 
such a tradeoff is inevitable.  Cash strapped
67 safety net programs, like Medicaid, often 
must directly choose between providing more generous benefits to current beneficiaries 
and expanding or contracting the number of beneficiaries they can serve.  For these 
programs, CER has the potential to increase the amount of information available to 
policymakers facing difficult tradeoffs, and could also help stretch available funding as 
far as possible. 
                                                 
65 See Congressional Budget Office, Health Care, 
http://www.cbo.gov/publications/collections/health.cfm (last visited April 20, 2011) 
(“[The Congressional Budget Office] and the [Joint Committee on Taxation] estimate 
that by 2019, the [ACA] will reduce the number of nonelderly people who are uninsured 
by about 32 million, leaving about 23 million nonelderly residents uninsured.”). 
66 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 53. 
67 See, e.g., Kevin Sack, For Governors, Medicaid Looks Ripe for Slashing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 2011, at A1 (noting that the Governor of Arizona was seeking federal permission 
to remove 280,000 adults from its Medicaid program, the Governor of California 
proposed saving $1.7 billion through cuts including limiting beneficiaries’ doctor visits 
and prescriptions, and the Governor of Georgia proposed ending “Medicaid coverage of 
dental, vision, and podiatry treatments for adults”).  
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C.  The Issue of Cost Effectiveness 
  As described above, one of the most contentious issues surrounding CER is its 
potential use to “ration” access to costly care.  But there is nothing inherent to CER that 
requires the consideration of costs; it is entirely possible to compare two treatments to 
determine whether one is more effective for a given purpose without taking their relative 
costs into account.  Thus, the issue of whether CER should take costs into consideration 
is a separate issue from whether it is beneficial to conduct, or use government funds to 
subsidize, CER.   
  Proposals to incorporate cost considerations into CER typically advocate for the 
use of cost-effectiveness analysis (“CEA”), in addition to comparative effectiveness 
analysis, to evaluate different treatments.  While CEA lacks a standard definition,
68 
generally speaking it is “a method designed to assess the comparative impacts of 
expenditures on different health interventions.”
69  A detailed analysis of the many 
complex issues associated CEA is beyond the scope of this paper.  Suffice it to say, 
however, that CEA involves far more than technical number crunching, and challenging 
                                                 
68 Peter D. Jacobson and Matthew L. Kanna, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Courts:  
Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 291, 293 (2001). 
69 ALAN M. GARBER ET AL., COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 26-27 
(1996) (Marthe R. Gold et al., eds.).  “The first step in [CEA] is to define the lifetime 
health effects of each intervention.  The next step is to calculate the lifetime health care 
costs that would result from using each intervention.  The costs and health benefits of an 
intervention are then often used to calculate the so-called incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio . . . [which] is the difference in costs between the intervention and an alternative, 
divided by the difference in their health outcomes or effectiveness.  This ratio is a 
measure of value:  A low ratio indicates the expenditure has a large positive effect on the 
patient’s health, while a higher ratio indicates a smaller benefit, a higher cost, or both.” 
Garber and Sox, infra note 349, at 1808.  
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technical and ethical questions are inherent to any effort to quantify health.
70  Although 
researchers have developed a measure called the “Quality Adjusted Life-Year” as an 
attempt to measure how a treatment impacts the length and the quality of an individual’s 
life,
71 the tool remains controversial.
72  
  Opponents of incorporating cost into CER often express concerns about the 
effects such research results might have on health care access, insurance coverage, 
provider reimbursement, and the health care provider and patient decisionmaking 
process.
73  Even among supporters of CER and CEA, however, there remains controversy 
over how closely to link the two forms of research.  Some observers argue in favor of 
fully integrating the two forms of analysis.
74  They contend that cost is necessarily an 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Paul Menzel et al., Toward a Broader View of Values in Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis of Health, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (1999) (advocating for better 
incorporation of social values into CEA); Peter J. Neumann and Magnus Johannesson, 
From Principle To Public Policy:  Using Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 13 Health Aff. 206, 
207-209 (1994) (describing challenges associated with CEA, including the incorporation 
of patient preferences).  For example, people may value the costs of a treatment’s adverse 
side effects or the benefits of being relieved a specific condition differently.  See Garber 
and Sox, infra note 349, at 1808. 
71 Garber and Sox, infra note 349, at 1808. 
72 See infra section III(b)(3). 
73 See, e.g., FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS 
RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, infra note 228, at 57. 
74 See, e.g., American College of Physicians, Information on Cost-Effectiveness:  An 
Essential Product of a National Comparative Effectiveness Program, 148 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 956 (2008) (arguing for an independent federally funded entity that 
would develop comparative-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness information, but 
suggesting that “cost should never be used as the sole criterion for evaluating a clinical 
intervention”); Katherine T. Adams, Rethinking Comparative Effectiveness Research, 6 
BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 35, 36 (2009) (In an interview with Dr. Donald Berwick, 
who later became the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services Administrator, quoting 
Dr. Berwick as saying “You could make [cost considerations] advisory, or you could 
make it mandatory, or you could make it a policy rule.  But to remain ignorant of the cost 
implications of a drug that is marginally better than what is already out there is simply 
bad policy.”).  
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important element of health care provider and patient decisionmaking.
75  Similarly, Alan 
Garber and Harold Sox have argued that because the CER included in the ACA will be 
partially funded by a tax on the health insurance industry,
76 the government should 
include with CER results cost information that would at least be useful to insurance 
companies when making coverage decisions, even if the government does not conduct 
CEA itself.
77  Others have argued that CEA should play a less prominent role in CER.  
The American Heart Association has taken the position that CER “may include estimates 
of cost and cost-effectiveness . . . but should focus on enhancing value for patients rather 
than minimizing costs.”
78  Even more firmly, health economist Dr. Gail Wilensky has 
argued that CEA should be entirely separate from any government effort to conduct CER, 
and that payers should be the group that conducts (and pays for) CEA.
79 
d.  Rationales for Government Involvement in CER 
  Even if the balance of potential harms and benefits favors the pursuit of CER, it 
does not necessarily follow that any level of government, and much less the federal 
government, should be involved in CER.  In fact, many critics of recent CER initiatives 
have argued that while CER is beneficial on the whole, it is both unnecessary and 
                                                 
75 Garber and Sox, infra note 349, at 1809. 
76 See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
77 Id. at 1809-1810.  In a previous editorial, Alan Garber analogized the health care 
system to a restaurant where the menu contains no prices, noting that in such a 
circumstances, “we should not be surprised by the size of the bill.”  Alan M Garber, A 
Menu without Prices, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 964 (2008).  It is important to 
distinguish, however, concerns about allowing any payer, including the federal 
government, to conduct CEA, and concerns about having the same organization conduct 
the two forms of analysis for fear that CEA would taint the effectiveness research.  See 
2007 CBO REPORT, infra note 84, at 26. 
78 Raymond J. Gibbons et al., The American Heart Association’s Principles for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, J. AM. HEART ASS’N 2955, 2955 (2009). 
79 Gail Wilensky, Cost-Effectiveness Information:  Yes, It’s Important, but Keep It 
Separate, Please!, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 967 (2008).  
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dangerous for the government to conduct or rely on CER when making important policy 
decisions.
80  Furthermore, the possibility of non-governmental actors conducting CER is 
not just theory, but a reality.  Some health insurance and hospitals have long played a role 
in generating and analyzing CER,
81 and pharmaceutical companies have also begun to 
test their own products against others on the market.
82 
  The primary economic rational for government involvement in CER is that CER 
constitutes a “public good.”  A public good is both “non-exclusive” and “non-rivalrous,” 
meaning that it is impractical to exclude non-payers, but additional users do not inhibit 
the ability of previous users to enjoy the good, respectively.
83  Information about the 
                                                 
80 HELEN EVANS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH 
CARE REFORM:  LESSONS FROM ABROAD, 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/02/comparative-effectiveness-in-health-
care-reform-lessons-from-abroad; MICHAEL F. CANNON, A BETTER WAY TO GENERATE 
AND USE COMPARATIVE-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH (2009), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa632.pdf; Gottlieb, infra note 218; cf. Ronen Avraham, A 
Market Solution for Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2011, at A31 (arguing for 
medical malpractice reform whereby health care providers who complied with best 
practice guidelines created by private sector entities would be immune from liability).  
Even among supporters of the ACA and its creation of a government agency to support 
CER, at least two members of Congress initially favored a public-private entity, which 
they felt could provide “a more efficient and transparent mechanism for the development 
and dissemination of evidence-based medicine.”  Patel, infra note 239, at 1778.   
81 See Wilensky, infra note 83, at w574. 
82 See, e.g., Tracy Staton, AZ Plots Push Into Comparative Effectiveness, Fierce Pharma, 
http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/az-plots-push-comparative-effectiveness/2011-02-03 
(Feb. 3, 2011, 11:25 EST) (describing the plans of AstraZeneca, a pharmaceutical 
company, to conduct CER on its own products); Posting of Shirley S. Wang to Wall 
Street Journal Health Blog, Comparing Drugs Is ‘Real World’ Demand, New PhRMA 
Head Says, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/04/06/comparing-drugs-is-real-world-
demand-new-phrma-head-says/?KEYWORDS=comparative+effectiveness+research 
(April 6, 2009, 08:53 EST). 
83 Gail R. Wilensky, The Policies and Politics of Creating a Comparative Clinical 
Effectiveness Research Center, 28 HEALTH AFF. w719, w721 (2009).  
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comparative effectiveness of different treatments fits within this model.
84  Although it 
would be possible to restrict access to the information, such restriction would seem to 
defeat the purpose of generating the information in the first place, and widespread use of 
the results of CER would not seem to harm those who originally paid for the research.
85 
Private actors tend to underproduce public goods, which arguably justifies government 
intervention to increase production to efficient levels.
86  Some observers disagree that the 
federal government must intervene in the case of public goods, because private markets 
will produce them under some circumstances.
87  In the case of CER, however, the public 
good problem may lead private actors to produce information narrowly tailored to their 
interests, resulting in fragmented and duplicative research.
88  
  Even if private markets are incapable of producing efficient levels of CER, some 
observers feel strongly that countervailing interests weigh against government 
involvement.  Government intervention can be costly in terms of tax dollars, government 
decisions are subject to political influence, and there is no guarantee that the government 
                                                 
84 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS 8-9 (2007) (hereinafter “2007 CBO REPORT”). 
85 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w721 – w722. 
86 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  REFORMING THE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM 111 (2008) (hereinafter “MEDPAC 2008”); Gail R. Wilensky, 
Developing A Center For Comparative Effectiveness Information, 25 HEALTH AFF. 
w572, w583 (2006).  
87 See, e.g., CANNON, supra note 80, at 3-4 (noting that “[m]arkets increase the quantity 
of nonexcludable goods ([for example] lobbying, research, charity) beyond the amount 
that people are willing to purchase directly, by bundling them with excludable goods ([for 
example] insurance, advertising, reputation, recreation). . . . Markets create incentives for 
private actors to overcome the challenges posed y public goods.  Innovators who develop 
ways to solve the free-rider problem can capture the money that others leave on the 
table.”).   
88 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w722.  In addition, past scandals involving research data 
produced by private health industry actors may contribute to public distrust of privately 
sponsored research.  See Fox, infra note 350, at 37-39.  
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will produce the optimal level of information.
89  At least one group has also argued that 
government participation in CER has potential to “crowd out” private investment, 
because private organizations that would have otherwise paid for CER themselves would 
seek government funding to support the research.
90  Nonetheless, given that private 
producers of CER have not generated enough information to fill the vast knowledge gaps 
that proponents of CER point to when advocating for more research,
91 it is at least 
reasonable to argue that the government could play a beneficial role in funding, 
conducting, or encouraging private entities to engage in more CER. 
II.  Models for Governmental Participation in CER 
  Before addressing the models of CER that the government has adopted so far, it 
makes sense to survey a sample of the broad array of options generally available to 
governments seeking to engage in CER.  These options demonstrate the trade-offs 
inherent to any effort to support CER through the federal government, such as between 
                                                 
89 CANNON, supra note 80, at 5. 
90 Id. at 8-9. 
91 For example, a 2010 study found that only approximately one-third of studies on 
medications published in “high-impact” general medical journals between June 2008 and 
September 2009 qualified as CER.  Michael Hochman and Danny McCormick, 
Characteristics of Published Comparative Effectiveness Studies of Medications, 303 
JAMA 951 (2010).  See also, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS:  PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 29 (2007) 
(hereinafter “MEDPAC 2007”) (“There is not enough credible, empirically based 
information for health care providers and patients to make informed decisions about 
alternative services for diagnosing and treatment most common clinical conditions.  
Many new services disseminate quickly into routine medical care with little or no basis 
for knowing whether they outperform existing treatments, and to what extent.”).  In 
addition, MedPAC has noted concerns that some industry-sponsored CER studies have 
been insufficiently objective and transparent.  Id. at 40-41.  The failure of the private 
sector to produce sufficient CER may be due in part to the reluctance of major payers in 
the health care industry, and namely, Medicare, to demand and use such information.  
Peter Orszag, Congressional Budget Office Testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Health, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 6 (June 12, 
2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=8209&type=0.  
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independence, credibility, and political accountability.
92  They also provide context to the 
government’s choices, as well as information about the policy implications of those 
choices that can inform predictions about the future of the government’s CER efforts. 
A.  Domestic Possibilities 
  In its 2008 Report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory Board 
(“MedPAC”)
93 surveyed the proposals of eight observers.
94  The proposals included a 
separate CER agency within HHS, a public-private partnership or a “quasi-governmental 
entity,” a new organization within AHRQ, or a “nonprofit independent institution.”
95  
Beyond demonstrating that there is a fairly broad range of ways in which the federal 
government could increase support for CER, this array of options demonstrates that in the 
years leading up to the passage of ARRA, it was far from obvious how the government 
could best encourage CER.  MedPAC itself argued in favor of a public-private entity, 
with an independent board that would determine and oversee the organization’s research 
agenda, that would fund CER studies.
96  The entity would sponsor and conduct research, 
serve as a “clearinghouse” for published CER literature, and help coordinate existing 
entities that also participate in CER.
97  MedPAC also emphasized the importance of strict 
conflict-of-interest requirements for the entity, as well as other ethics rules.
98 
                                                 
92 See 2007 CBO REPORT, infra note 84, at 16-17. 
93 MedPAC is “an independent Congressional Agency . . . [that advises] the U.S. 
Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program.”  “About MedPAC,” 
http://www.medpac.gov/about.cfm (last accessed Feb. 10, 2011). 
94 MEDPAC 2008, supra note 86, at 112. 
95 Id. 
96 See MEDPAC 2008, supra note 86, at 111; see also MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 
41-49. 
97 MEDPAC 2008, supra note 86, at 113-116. 
98 Id. at 119-120.  
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Another potential opportunity to conduct CER rests within the federal Food and 
Drug Administration.  Because of the role the FDA already plays in compiling some data 
on drug, and to a lesser extent, device,
99 safety and efficacy (usually relative to a 
placebo),
100 the FDA would seem like a natural home for CER.
101  One author has gone 
so far as to argue that the current approval process harms patients, who may receive new 
treatments that are more effective than a placebo, but less safe and effective than existing 
treatments.
102   
Indeed, the FDA is already experimenting with the development of a database of 
aggregated health information that could be used for a broad range of research queries.
103  
So far, the FDA has mainly used this system to react to safety problems, although it has 
                                                 
99 Medical devices are subject to a different regulatory regime than drugs.  Briefly, the 
FDA divides devices into three classes based on safety risk, with the lowest class exempt 
from FDA notification and approval requirements, the middle class subject to a 
“substantial equivalence” standard with regard to a product already on the market, and 
the highest class (including devices for which there is no existing substantially equivalent 
product) subject to premarket approval that includes safety and efficacy analysis.  See 
generally, Food and Drug Administration, Overview of Device Regulation, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.ht
m#510k (last visited March 30, 2011). 
100 See MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 33.  In certain circumstances, such as when it 
would be clearly unethical not to provide an unapproved drug to study participants, the 
FDA may require proof of superiority to an existing alternative rather than a placebo.  
Stafford, infra note 107, at 230-231. 
101 Notably, however, the FDA does not regulate surgical and diagnostic procedures, 
which limits the impact and scope of any CER that the FDA could undertake without 
significantly expanding its regulatory reach. MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 33. 
102 Alec B. O’Connor, Building Comparative Efficacy and Tolerability Into the FDA 
Approval Process, 303 JAMA 979 (2010). 
103 Rachel E. Behrman et al., Developing the Sentinel System – A National Resource for 
Evidence Development, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498 (2011).  While the Sentinel system is 
designed to help monitor product safety, however, its value is limited by the system’s 
failure to consider issues related to cost and scientific evidence.  See Alexander and 
Stafford, supra note 22, at 2490.   
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potential for broader use that includes CER.
104  In order to conduct or facilitate CER, 
however, Congress would need to expand the FDA’s authority to change the type of 
information it requires from drug and device manufacturers to include data on 
comparisons to relevant alternative treatments.
105  Furthermore, to ensure high quality 
CER, as opposed to studies designed to improve the odds of FDA approval, the FDA 
would likely need to exercise some supervision over the quality of submitted CER studies 
as well.
106  The FDA could also require the inclusion of comparative effectiveness 
information on drug labels.
107  
Some observers have argued, however, that incorporation of CER into the FDA’s 
approval process would disrupt the FDA’s “economic role as a market regulator” that 
facilitates competition in the market for medical treatments by approving all safe and 
effective drugs and devices for a given condition.
108  In addition, by using CER to serve a 
gate keeping function, the FDA might inadvertently bar treatments that would have 
otherwise developed a comparative advantage over time, for example, if new information 
                                                 
104 See Lynn M. Etheredge, Creating A High-Performance System For Comparative 
Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1761, 1762 (2010) (advocating for expansion of 
the Sentinel Initiative to “systematically collect data on therapies’ effectiveness, starting 
when a new therapy first enters clinical practice.”).   
105 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w574, MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 33 (Noting that, 
in addition to the fact that the agency’s regulatory scope is limited and it usually looks at 
studies comparing a product to a placebo, even for products required to submit clinical 
trial results to the FDA, the typical study design is often not conducive to generating 
useful information for CER.  The FDA’s limited authority with regard to post-market 
surveillance of an approved product is another barrier to the agency’s ability to 
participate in CER.). 
106 O’Connor, supra note 102, at 979-980. 
107 Randall S. Stafford et al., New, but Not Improved?  Incorporating Comparative 
Effectiveness Information into FDA Labeling, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1230 (2009). 
108 Garrison Jr. et al., note 15, at 1815.  
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became available about a drug’s comparative effectiveness or safety within a certain 
subpopulation.
109 
Similarly, the government could use its authority under the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs to require that treatment manufacturers submit CER information in 
order to be covered under those programs.
110  As of June 2007, for example, CMS had 
begun to compile evidence about services not covered in the past, and on occasion also 
collaborated with other federal agencies, such as AHRQ, to sponsor “head-to-head” trials 
and technological assessments.
111  Past efforts to incorporate CER into CMS coverage 
determinations have met political opposition, however, including direct prohibitions from 
Congress.
112  Given this history, and the controversy surrounding the use of CER findings 
in health insurance coverage determinations, it is clear that increased political support, at 
the least, would be necessary for CMS to be a viable route toward the generation of more 
CER studies.
113 
Alternately, in 2006 Dr. Gail Wilensky proposed a center, either funded publicly 
or through user-fees,
114 for CER that would “fund prospective trials on key questions for 
which comparative effectiveness evidence was found missing, in addition to funding 
systematic reviews of existing research.”
115  The center would focus on the generation of 
new information, and would be located in such a way as to minimize conflict of interest 
and stakeholder pressure, while maintaining a reputation for producing “objective and 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w722. 
111 MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 34; 2007 CBO REPORT, supra note 84, at 11. 
112 MEDPAC 2008, supra note 86, at 129; see also JACBOSON, supra note 14, at 29. 
113 See MEDPAC 2008, supra note 86, at 130 (noting that additional statutory authority 
for CMS would probably be necessary for the agency to effectively use CER findings). 
114 Id. at w583. 
115 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w577.  
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credible” data.
116  Wilensky called for improved coordination of health services research 
within the federal government, perhaps by placing the CER center within the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”) or elsewhere in the Department of Health 
and Human Services (“HHS”), with CER on a particular treatment triggered by FDA 
approval.
117  As an alternative to a federal agency, Wilensky also suggested that the 
center could exist either as a “quasi-governmental entity” or within the private sector as a 
not-for-profit organization, although she noted that the latter option lacked support as a 
realistic possibility, either in the government or the private sector, as of 2006.
118   
In 2008, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), proposed the creating of a similar entity, 
the Health Care Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute, which would have been a 
nonprofit corporation with the purpose of “advancing the quality and thoroughness of 
evidence concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions 
can effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, and managed 
clinically through research and evidence synthesis, and the dissemination of research 
findings.”
119  The bill, however, died in committee.
120   
In 2005, AcademyHealth, a non-profit organization focused on health services 
research,
121 also released a proposal for a center for CER within a larger health services 
research agency in the federal government, with AHRQ remaining the lead health 
                                                 
116 Id.   
117 Id, at w578. 
118 Id, at w580 – w582. 
119 Comparative Effectiveness Research Act of 2008, S. 3408, 110th Cong. (2008). 
120 For a list providing a sample of some other bills proposed in the 110th Congress to 
support CER, as well as such bills proposed in the 109th Congress, see JACOBSON, supra 
note 14, at 41-50. 
121 See “About Us – Academy Health,” 
http://www.academyhealth.org/About/content.cfm?ItemNumber=2070 (last visited 
March 30, 2011).  
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services research agency.
122  The organization then discussed four options to accomplish 
this goal,
123 but did not endorse a particular option.
124  Due to the contentious nature of 
some CER, in which there may be “winners and losers” within the health care industry,
125 
the report noted that its options would provide varying degrees of political insulation for 
the research.  AcademyHealth also identified five “principles” that should govern 
Congress’ decision about the placement of a CER entity, including separation of 
scientific assessment from funding and coverage issues, congressional oversight, 
stakeholder participation, transparency, and funding for a broad range of research 
topics.
126  Although Congress did not ultimately adopt AcademyHealth’s model CER 
entity in its reauthorization of AHRQ, the organization’s recommendations provide 
useful analysis about some of the considerations that accompany the balance between 
government accountability and autonomy from political influences. 
B.  International Models 
                                                 
122 See generally ACADEMYHEALTH, PLACEMENT, COORDINATION, AND FUNDING OF 
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2005), available at 
www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/placementreport.pdf.  The report notes that 
allowing AHRQ to remain the lead agency for health services research “on par with the 
other HHS agencies” will ensure visibility for the work and also encourage effective 
interaction with other HHS agencies and Congress.  Id. at 3. 
123 (1) AHRQ would sponsor and conduct the CER, but would be overseen by an 
“external board and panel of experts;” (2) in addition to the first option, AHRQ would 
establish an independent Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
(“FFDRC”); (3) a new, quasi-governmental entity would fund and conduct CER outside 
of AHRQ; and (4) AHRQ would be converted to a quasi-governmental agency that 
would conduct CER as well as carry out its existing functions.  Id. at 11.  An FFDRC is a 
federally funded entity that operates as a private, not-for-profit organization; some 
FFDRCs are located within other organizations.  Id. at 15. 
124 Id. at 10-11. 
125 Id. at 9-10. 
126 Id. at 12.  
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Beyond the models, discussed above, that are designed around existing 
institutions within, or characteristics of, the United States government, it is also useful to 
briefly consider the models that other countries have used to generate, support and use 
CER.
127  The unique characteristics of the United States health care system suggest that 
widespread integration of CER into the health delivery system is likely to be more 
challenging in the United States than in other developed countries.
128  Nonetheless, one 
set of authors has noted that CER in other countries tends to be a “demand-driven 
activity,” in the sense that it serves to meet “the needs of public and private payers, 
patients, clinical professionals, and policymakers.”
129  Given that those needs are likely to 
be, at the least, similar in the United States as in other countries that have developed 
frameworks for supporting CER, the experiences of those countries may provide some 
helpful lessons for the road ahead in the United States.
130 
The model most frequently cited by critics of governmental CER efforts in the 
United States is NICE in the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom has a highly 
centralized
131 health system, the NHS, which provides care to all residents with no point-
                                                 
127 Notably, however, CER is an American term.  Other countries refer to such research 
as “health technology assessment” or “evidence-informed policymaking.”  Kalipso 
Chalkidou et al., Comparative Effectiveness Research and Evidence-Based Health 
Policy:  Experience from Four Countries, 87 MILIBANK Q. 339, 340 (2009). 
128 For example, because the United States has a “multipayer” system, any organization 
or institution involved in CER must have strong legitimacy, through the production of 
“objective and unbiased data,” to support widespread adoption. Wilensky, supra note 83, 
at w576. 
129 Chalkidou, supra note 127, at 344. 
130 For a general comparison of government-sponsored CER in the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and Australia, see id. at 345. 
131 Note, however, that “NHS” is divided into four somewhat independent systems, one 
for each of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.  I refer to the NHS as 
centralized in the sense that it is entirely taxpayer funded, the system’s policies and 
budget are largely set on a national level, and hospitals and physicians both contract  
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of-service charge to consumers.
132  Although the NHS has been the subject of much 
criticism by opponents of health reform in the United States, and domestic political 
pressure has also led to some reforms in the system,
133 the NHS remains a very popular 
institution in the United Kingdom.
134  Within the NHS, NICE analyzes data about 
medical technologies that are unusually significant in terms of cost, health outcomes, or 
controversy.
135  A group of academic experts analyzes CER data, and then a group within 
NICE, the Technological Appraisal Committee (“TAC”), which is made up of a variety 
of stakeholders, reviews the evaluation and makes a recommendation.  The 
recommendations of TAC can be appealed, and the NHS may choose whether to adopt 
NICE’s ultimate recommendations, except to the extent that NICE recommends coverage 
of a particular drug.
136  As part of its original mission, NICE explicitly conducts cost-
effectiveness analysis for the treatments it studies.
 137  NICE also conducts “budget 
impact analysis” as part of its evaluation, but the latter does not factor into the entity’s 
decisions.
138 
                                                 
directly with the government for all of the services they provide.  For a more nuanced 
description of the NHS, see generally SEAN BOYLE, THE ENGLISH HEATH CARE SYSTEM 
(2008), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Topics/International-Health-
Policy/Countries/~/media/Files/Publications/Other/2010/Jun/International%20Profiles/14
17_Squires_Intl_Profiles_England.pdf. 
132 See generally “International Health Systems – UK,” http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-
Modules/International-Health-Systems/UK.aspx (last visited March 30, 2011). 
133 See The Final Frontier, The Economist, Jan. 13, 2011. 
134 See Posting of Robert Mackey to The Lede Blog (N.Y. Times), British Leaders 
Defend Their Health Service, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/british-
leaders-defend-their-health-service/ (Aug. 14, 2009, 12:38 EST). 
135 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w575. 
136 Id. at w576. 
137 Chalkidou, supra note 127, at 350. 
138 Id.  
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In addition to the United Kingdom, the governments of Australia, Canada and 
Germany, among other countries and international organizations,
139 have also developed 
mechanisms that support CER.  Like the United Kingdom, Australia also has a national 
health system called Medicare, which provides health insurance for citizens, and some 
residents, of Australia.
140  In order to be included in Australia’s national drug formulary, 
a drug must be recommended by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
(“PBAC”).
141  The PBAC, however, does not publish the rationales or data supporting its 
recommendations,
142 and CER efforts are limited to prescription medications.
143  Like 
NICE, the PBAC considers cost-effectiveness analysis, but the committee also considers 
budget impact analysis as part of its recommendations.
144  In support of the committee’s 
efforts, a 2001 study found that the PBAC might play a role in the relatively low prices of 
pharmaceutical products in Australia.
145 
Canada also has universal health insurance coverage through a health system 
called Medicare, which is administered jointly by the federal, provincial and territorial 
                                                 
139 The Cochrane Collaboration is an example of an international organization that 
reviews health care treatments to support the use of evidence-based medicine.  See The 
Cochrane Collaboration, About Us, http://www.cochrane.org/about-us (last visited March 
29, 2011); see also 2007 CBO REPORT, supra note 84, at 7. 
140 See generally THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
(2009), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Topics/International-Health-
Policy/Countries/~/media/Files/Publications/Other/2010/Jun/International%20Profiles/14
17_Squires_Intl_Profiles_Australia.pdf. 
141 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w575. 
142 Id. 
143 Chalkidou, supra note 127, at 347. 
144 Id. at 350. 
145 See Australia Productivity Commission, International Pharmaceutical Differences 
(2001), available at http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/pbsprices/docs/finalreport.  
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governments.
146  Since 2003, Canada has had a Common Drug Review (“CDR”) 
procedure for new drugs.  An expert advisory committee analyzes the assessments of 
reviewers (either within or external to the CDR), and makes a non-binding coverage 
recommendation to the provinces, territories, and the federal government, which the 
manufacturer may appeal.  Canada’s drug plans, however, follow the CDR’s 
recommendations approximately 90% of the time.
147  The CDR does not publish either 
the data or assessment used for its recommendation, but does make its rationale public.
148  
Beyond analyzing the comparative effectiveness of new drugs relative to current standard 
treatments, the CDR also considers the comparative cost effectiveness of the drugs it 
studies.
149 
In Germany, which has universal health insurance through a combination of 
public and private health insurance plans,
150 a publicly funded private foundation called 
the Institute for Quality and Efficiency (“IQWiG”) evaluates drugs, treatments and 
clinical practice guidelines for certain diseases.
151  Coverage decision for the public 
health insurance plans (“Statutory Health Insurance”), which cover approximately 85% 
                                                 
146 See generally, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE CANADIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
(2009), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Topics/International-Health-
Policy/Countries/~/media/Files/Publications/Other/2010/Jun/International%20Profiles/14
17_Squires_Intl_Profiles_Canada.pdf. 
147 Fiona M. Clement et al., Using Effectiveness and Cost-effectiveness to Make Drug 
Coverage Decisions, 302 JAMA 1437, 1438 (2009). 
148 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w576. 
149 Clement, supra note 147. 
150 See generally REINHARD BUSSE AND STEPHANIE STOCK, THE GERMAN HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM (2009), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Topics/International-
Health-
Policy/Countries/~/media/Files/Publications/Other/2010/Jun/International%20Profiles/14
17_Squires_Intl_Profiles_Germany.pdf. 
151 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w576.  
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of the German population,
152 hinge on IQWiG’s reports,
153 although there is an arms-
length relationship between IQWiG and the committee that ultimately decides how to 
transform IQWiG’s recommendations into health policy.
154  IQWiG considers scientific 
evidence about a wide range of medical treatments, and since 2007, the organization has 
also considered the results of cost-benefit and budget impact analyses.
155  The institute 
then disseminates the findings of its research through a website targeted at health care 
consumers.
156 
Among countries whose governments sponsor CER, a number of trends are 
evident.  The entities have varying levels of independence from both the central 
governments that support them and other financial stakeholders.
157  Other trends include 
emphasis on transparency in topic selection, research analysis and final decisions, 
concern about scientific standards, the inclusion of mechanism for reconsideration of 
decisions adverse to stakeholders, and timeliness standards that require technologies to be 
studied when they are relatively new and diffusion into the market is not yet complete.
158  
In addition, the entities often started out without taking into account comparative cost 
information, but evolved to consider some forms of CEA.
159  The entities tend to conduct 
research by synthesizing existing studies rather than conducting their own prospective 
trials of new technology, although evidence development, in the form of supporting 
                                                 
152 BUSSE, supra note 150. 
153 Wilensky, supra note 83, at w576. 
154 Chalkidou, supra note 127, at 352-353. 
155 Chalkidou, supra note 127, at 347, 350. 
156 Informed Health Online, http://www.informedhealthonline.org/index.en.html (last 
visited March 30, 2011). 
157 Chalkidou, supra note 127, at 357. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 357-358.  
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studies of new technologies, is increasingly important.
160  Studies have found, however, 
that some of these programs face persistent problems with the strength and quality of the 
evidence that they analyze, although they address these challenges differently.
161  Lastly, 
proponents of CER tend not to emphasize cost control or rationing, but instead focus on 
the potential for CER to improve health care quality and reduce waste.
162 
III.  Sources of Support for CER To Date 
A.  Private 
  In addition to public entities, a number of private companies and organizations 
participate in generating and analyzing CER.
163  Historically, a significant source of 
privately funded and conducted CER has been the Technology Evaluation Center 
(“TEC”), which is a program run by the Blue Cross/Blue Shield association in 
partnership with Kaiser Permanente.
164  The TEC conducts approximately 20-25 
assessments each year of drugs, devices and medical procedures to evaluate “clinical 
effectiveness and appropriateness.”
165  Some of these assessments include comparative-
effectiveness or cost-effectiveness studies.
166  Despite that the TEC provides its 
assessments “solely for informational purposes,”
167 the organization does advise local 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans and other entities that make insurance coverage decisions 
                                                 
160 Id. at 358-359. 
161 Clement, supra note 147, at 1442. 
162 Id. at 360. 
163 See generally 2007 CBO REPORT, supra note 84, at 8. 
164 Technology Evaluation Center:  Kaiser Collaboration, 
http://www.bcbs.com/blueresources/tec/kaiser-collaboration.html (last visited March 30, 
2011). 
165 What is the Technology Evaluation Center?, 
http://www.bcbs.com/blueresources/tec/what-is-tec.html (last visited March 30, 2011). 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
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about the degree to which a given technology is likely to improve health outcomes.
168  
Other private technology assessment companies, large health insurers, and managed care 
organizations also conduct this type of research.
169 
B.  Public 
1.  Before 2009 
  Before the financial crisis of 2008 and the deep recession that followed prompted 
Congress to pass ARRA,
170 the primary federal agency focusing on CER was the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”).
171  CER, however, is not the agency’s 
primary mission, which is generally “to improve the quality, safety, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of health care for all Americans.”
172  
Originally, AHRQ was named the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research 
(“AHCPR”).  Congress created the AHCPR in 1989 in response to concerns about waste 
in the health care system and the lack of scientific support for many medical treatments, 
as well to serve as a replacement for another now-extinct federal agency, the National 
                                                 
168 TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, THE MEDICARE COVERAGE DETERMINATION PROCESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS:  AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 208 (2005). 
169 Id.  For an example of a consumer-oriented technology assessment program, see 
Consumer Reports, Safe and Effective Drug Recommendations from Best Buy Drugs, 
http://www.consumerreports.org/health/best-buy-drugs/index.htm (last visited March 30, 
2011).   
170 For a more detailed discussion about the federal government’s history of conducting 
and using comparative-effectiveness and cost-effectiveness information, see generally 
JACOBSON, supra note 14, at 22-25, 29- 33, 35. 
171 The NIH is the primary funder of CER, but because the agency does not “tag” its CER 
studies, they are not readily identifiable. FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR 
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, infra note 228, at 29.  In a pilot identification 
project, the Council found approximately 463 NIH-funded CER studies in the year 2008, 
compared to 144 studies conducted by AHRQ during the fiscal years 2006-2009.  Id. at 
28-29.  
172 AHRQ At A Glance:  Mission, Focus, and Goals, 
http://www.ahrq.gov/about/ataglance.htm (last visited March 30, 2011).  
  38 
Center for Health Services Research and Health Care Technology Assessment.
173  The 
AHCPR was authorized to conduct research, demonstration projects, and trainings, as 
well as to develop guidelines and disseminate research findings.
174  Advocates for 
outcomes research, however, made a conscious decision to separate the agency from the 
Health Care Financing Administration in order to avoid highlighting the cost-containment 
implications of the research.
175   
Health services research generally, however, faced some problems related to the 
reality that unlike other forms of research, it lacked a large constituency of advocates 
other than researchers.
176  Despite that the AHCPR had been created during a Republican 
presidential administration and with the support of key conservative members of 
Congress, the agency nearly lost its funding during the battles over the federal budget in 
1995-1996, when critics argued that it was wasteful and ineffective.
177  Congress’ 
decision in 1992 to direct the agency to consider cost-effectiveness in its assessments 
generated significant controversy.
178  The AHCPR’s links with the failed Clinton health 
                                                 
173 See Bradford H. Gray, The Legislative Battle Over Health Services Research, 11 
HEALTH AFF. 38 (1992) (describing the legislative history of the creation of the AHCPR, 
and noting that its creation “was driven substantially by outcomes research and the hope 
that such research might help to prevent unnecessary Medicare spending.”).  In analyzing 
the legislative history of the creation of the AHCPR, Gray emphasizes that the agency 
serves as a valuable case study regarding the federal government’s difficulty in making 
health policy, even in the face of a “rational response to a significant problem” and 
bipartisan support.  Id. at 64-65.  The number of agencies that Congress has created and 
dissolved in relation to CER and similar research, starting in the 1970s and continuing 
through the present, may be a symptom of this difficulty.  See 2007 CBO REPORT, supra 
note 84, at 9. 
174 Gray, supra note 173, at 40. 
175 Id. at 63. 
176 Bradford H. Gray et al., AHCPR And The Changing Politic Of Health Services 
Research, 22 HEALTH AFF. w3-283, 285 (2003). 
177 Id. at 294-296. 
178 JACOBSON, supra note 14, at 23.  
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reform effort, and pushback from surgeons in response to a report that found insufficient 
evidence to support spinal fusion surgery for low-back pain, also caused the agency 
political problems.
179   
With the support of a number of professional organizations, advocacy groups, and 
individual supporters, however, the agency survived, albeit with a significantly reduced 
budget.
180  The agency re-focused its efforts on health care quality issues and 
dissemination, and also shifted away from the politically controversial practice of directly 
developing practice guidelines, which were then created by non-governmental 
organizations through the use of external evidence-based practice centers.
181  The 
agency’s 1999 reauthorization legislation
182 removed the word “policy” from its name, 
thus transforming the agency into AHRQ.
183 
Today, as in the years leading up to the passage of ARRA and the ACA, AHRQ 
primarily engages in secondary CER, by conducting systematic reviews and syntheses of 
existing research through its Effective Health Care Program.
184  To accomplish this task, 
                                                 
179 Gray, supra note 176, at 296-298. 
180 Id. at 299-301. 
181 Id. at 302-303. 
182 Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999, P.L. 106-129 (1999) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 299 et seq.). 
183 Gray, supra note 176, at 303. 
184 FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 
infra note 228, at 31; Jean R. Slutsky and Carolyn M. Clancy, AHRQ’s Effective Health 
Care Program:  Why Comparative Effectiveness Matters, 24 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 67 
(2009) (in an article written by the Director of AHRQ and the Director of the agency’s 
Center for Outcomes and Evidence, the authors argue that AHRQ’s program is unique 
due to its “relevance, timeliness, and transparency”).  The Effective Health Care Program 
was created by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, P. L. 108-173, 108th Cong., § 
1013 (2003), to study “the outcomes, comparative clinical effectiveness, and 
appropriateness of health care items and services . . . and strategies for improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of such [Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP], including the ways  
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AHRQ contracts with 13 “evidence-based centers” that carry out systematic reviews and 
technology assessments, as well as some cost-effectiveness analyses,
185 about the 
agency’s 14 priority conditions that are of particular significance to the Medicare, 
Medicaid or Children’s Health Insurance programs.
186  AHRQ notifies manufacturers 
when it begins reviews of their products, and solicits public comments and other 
stakeholder input.
187  The agency then disseminates this information to health care 
providers and consumers through a series of guides, in the form of documents, videos, 
and audio files, some of which are also provided in Spanish.
188 
  Other federal agencies also conduct or support CER.  The NIH is the agency 
within the federal government that funds the most CER through grants,
189 but until 
                                                 
in which such items and services are organized, managed, and delivered under such 
programs.”  Id. § 1013(a)(1). 
185 MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 37. 
186 The fourteen conditions are:  “arthritis and nontraumatic joint disorders; cancer; 
cardiovascular disease, including stroke and hypertension; dementia, including 
Alzheimer’s disease; depression and other mental health disorders; developmental delays, 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and autism; diabetes mellitus; functional 
limitations and disability; infectious diseases, including human immunodeficiency virus 
and AIDS; obesity, peptic ulcer disease and dyspepsia; pregnancy, including preterm 
birth; pulmonary disease and asthma; [and] substance abuse.”  Slutsky and Clansy, supra 
note 184, at 68.  Medicare, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program are 
governed by Titles XVIII, XIX, and XXI, respectively, of the Social Security Act. 
187 Id. 
188 See, e.g., Choosing Pain Medicine for Osteoarthritis – Consumer Guide, 
http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/search-for-guides-reviews-and-
reports/?pageaction=displayproduct&productid=4 (last visited March 30, 2011); 
Medicamentos Antideprisivos:  Guía Para Adultos Con Depresión – Consumer Guide, 
http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/search-for-guides-reviews-and-
reports/?pageaction=displayproduct&productID=153&returnpage= (last visited March 
30, 2011); Comparative Effectiveness of Management Strategies for Gastrophageal 
Reflux Disease, http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/search-for-guides-reviews-
and-reports/?pageaction=displayproduct&productid=42 (last visited March 30, 2011). 
189 MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 37.  
  41 
recently it had not sought to identify which of its funded studies qualify as CER.
190  The 
United States Preventive Services Task Force, an independent panel of scientific experts 
that works in collaboration with AHRQ, also assesses the effectiveness of a variety of 
preventive health care services and issues recommendations that serve as the “gold 
standard” for preventive health care services.
191  During fiscal years 2006 through 2009, 
the Department of Defense (“DoD”) also conducted approximately 25 CER studies, and 
the Veterans Health Administration (“VHA”) conducted 96.
192 
The VHA’s role in conducting CER relevant to its patient population, and 
particularly “practical” CER,
193 is notable; the VHA also sometimes requires that the 
manufacturers of products it might buy submit cost-effectiveness analyses, particularly 
with regard to drugs that appear to be marginally more effective, but much more 
expensive, than alternatives.
194  A prominent example of CER conducted with the support 
of the VHA was the COURAGE trial (Clinical Outcomes Utilizing Revascularization and 
Aggressive Drug Evaluation), whose results were published in the New England Journal 
of Medicine in 2007.
195  The study found no additional benefits (in the form of long term 
death rates, nonfatal heart attacks or hospitalization for acute coronary syndromes) to the 
use of coronary stents or other scaffolding (“percutaneous coronary intervention” or 
                                                 
190 See supra note 171. 
191 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force:  About the USPTF, 
http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/intro.htm (last visited March 30, 2011); 
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/uspstfix.htm (last 
visited March 30, 2011). 
192 Id. at 30. 
193 Id. at 31. 
194 MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 37. 
195 Willam E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy with or without PCI for Stable 
Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503 (2007).  The Congressional Budget 
Office used this study as an example of CER disproving a widely held belief in its 2007 
paper for Congress on CER.  2007 CBO REPORT, supra note 84, at 4.  
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“PCI”) among individuals with stable coronary artery disease, when used for initial 
disease management purposes.
196  Although the study’s results were groundbreaking, 
many cardiologists resisted incorporating the findings into everyday practice by failing to 
conduct tests that would determine whether PCI was appropriate for particular patients 
given the study’s findings.
197  While some of the resistance likely derived from 
disagreement with characteristics of the study, the financial incentives facing physicians 
and device manufacturers also probably played a role, given the high price of stent 
procedures and the fact that insurers mostly did not restrict coverage of the procedures 
based on the outcome of the study.
198  The VHA’s experience thus demonstrates the 
complex nature not only of disseminating CER findings, but ensuring that health care 
providers accept and incorporate the results into practice.
199  Yet, the VHA is unique 
because it has a dedicated initiative
200 and center
201 that assist with the implementation of 
research findings within the VA health care system and tackle these challenges head-on. 
  In addition to the federally funded CER programs, states have also engaged in 
activities to generate and use CER.
202  The Drug Effectiveness Review Project (“DERP”) 
at the Oregon Health and Science University conducts systematic comparative-
                                                 
196 Boden, supra note 195, at 1514. 
197 Keith J. Winstein, A Simple Health-Care Fix Fizzles Out, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2010, 
at A1. 
198 Id. 
199 Interestingly, the dissemination of CER regarding PCI as a treatment for acute heart 
attacks was a success.  See Aanand D. Naik and Laura A Petersen, The Neglected 
Purpose of Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1929, 1930 
(2009). 
200 Quality Enhancement Research Initiative (QUERI), http://www.queri.research.va.gov/ 
(last visited March 30, 2011). 
201 Center for Implementation Practice and Research Support, 
http://www.queri.research.va.gov/ciprs.cfm (last visited March 30, 2011). 
202 For charts comparing the types of CER conducted or supported by AHRQ, NIH, the 
Department of Defense, and the VHA, see MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 32.  
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effectiveness reviews for a self-managed and collaborative group of eleven states, as well 
as the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health.
203  Although DERP 
provides members with the findings of CER studies of drugs (which do not include CEA 
or other cost considerations), members retain total freedom with regard to how the 
information influences their policy decisions.
204  Likewise, the state of Washington also 
has a health technology assessment program (“HTAP”).
205  Unlike DERP, the HTAP 
explicitly considers whether a studied technology is cost effective.
206  Nonetheless, the 
HTAP has faced problems.  For example, when the program sought to incorporate the 
results of the VHA’s COURAGE study into the state’s health insurance programs by 
conducting a review of the evidence supporting stents, it encountered significant industry 
opposition.
207  The external firm it hired to conduct the review, for example, decided the 
study was not feasible after industry leaders and physicians declined to cooperate.
208  As 
                                                 
203 See generally, Drug Effectiveness Review Project (DERP), 
http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/research/centers-institutes/evidence-based-policy-
center/derp/index.cfm/ (last visited March 30, 2011); MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 
37.  For the current members of DERP, see Participating Organizations, 
http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/research/centers-institutes/evidence-based-policy-
center/derp/participating-organizations.cfm (last visited March 30, 2011).  For analysis of 
the challenges and successes of the project, which began in 2003, see generally Peter J. 
Neumann, Emerging Lessons From The Drug Effectiveness Review Project, 25 HEALTH 
AFF. w262 (2006); see also Mark Gibson and John Santa, The Drug Effectiveness Review 
Project:  An Important Step Forward, 25 HEALTH AFF. w272 (2006) (rebutting criticisms 
of the project). 
204 Neumann, supra note 203, at w263-w264. 
205 MEDPAC 2007, supra note 91, at 37; Health Technology Assessment Program (HTA), 
http://www.hta.hca.wa.gov/ (last visited March 30, 2011). 
206 About the Program, http://www.hta.hca.wa.gov/about.html (last visited March 30, 
2011). 
207 Winstein, supra note 197. 
208 Id. (“We don’t want to end up being our own willing executioners,” said . . . the senior 
director of health economics for . . . a stent maker” on a call with the firm.).  
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a consequence, HTAP had to conduct a narrower review that did not follow the 
COURAGE study.
209  
2.  ARRA 
  In early 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  
Although the bill was, at least ostensibly, a necessary emergency response to the financial 
crisis and economic recession that began in December 2007,
210 it was a controversial 
piece of legislation.
211  One aspect of the statute that failed to garner much attention 
before its passage, probably due to the law’s fast legislative timeline and complexity, was 
its significant investments in CER.   
  Two sections of ARRA address CER.  The first, section 804, created the Federal 
Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research (“Coordinating 
Council”).
212  The statute described the purpose of the Coordinating Council as fostering 
“optimum coordination of comparative effectiveness and related health services research 
conducted or supported by relevant Federal departments and agencies, with the goal of 
reducing duplicative efforts and encouraging coordinated and complementary use of 
resources.”
213  To meet this objective, the statute required the Coordinating Council to 
have at most fifteen members that are all federal employees or officers, to be appointed 
                                                 
209 Id. 
210 See Edmund L. Andrews, Officials Vow to Act Amid Signs of Long Recession, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at A1. 
211 See, e.g., Op-ed, The Stimulus Tragedy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at A1 (arguing the 
stimulus was too large); Leslie Eaton, Governors Agree on Woes But Disagree on 
Stimulus, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A3; Paul Krugman, Failure to Rise, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 2009, at A31 (arguing the stimulus was too small). 
212 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, § 804 (2009). 
213 ARRA § 804(c) (2009).  
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by the President through the Secretary of HHS.
214  Section 804 required the Council to 
submit annual reports to Congress and the President about the federal government’s CER 
efforts, but the law explicitly stated that section 804 did not give the Council authority “to 
mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer.”
215  
The Coordinating Council, however, was a short-lived endeavor.  Section 6302 of the 
ACA terminated the Council as of the date of its enactment, March 23, 2010, just over a 
year after the passage of ARRA. 
  The second section of ARRA that addresses CER is in Title VIII of the statute, 
which appropriates a total of $1.1 billion for the research.  Of that sum, Congress 
allocated $400 million to the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), $400 million to the 
Secretary of HHS (to distribute at her discretion), and $300 million to AHRQ.
216 
Congress required that the money be spent on “efforts that: (1) conduct, support, or 
synthesize research that compares the clinical outcomes, effectiveness, and 
appropriateness of items, services, and procedures that are used to prevent, diagnose, or 
treat diseases, disorders, and other health conditions; and (2) encourage the development 
and use of clinical registries, clinical data networks, and other forms of electronic health 
data that can be used to generate or obtain outcomes data,”
217 the former of which 
suggests the definition of CER used by Congress for the purpose of the Stimulus Act.  In 
conjunction with the funds, Congress required HHS to contract with the IOM to issue a 
                                                 
214 ARRA § 804(d)(1) (2009).  ARRA also required that eight health-related federal 
agencies have representatives on the board (AHRQ, CMS, the National Institutes of 
Health, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, the 
FDA, the Veterans Health Administration and the Department of Defense). 
215 ARRA §§ 804(e), (g)(1) (2009). 
216 ARRA Title VIII (2009) 
217 Id.  
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report on national priorities for CER.  Congress then instructed the Secretary of HHS to 
consider this report, as well as recommendations by the Coordinating Council, when 
funding CER projects and awarding grants.  The statute also ordered that the funded 
agencies provide reports to Congress, and that grantees allow for public comment on their 
research, “to the extent feasible.” 
ARRA’s provisions on CER generated significant after-the-fact criticism.
218  For 
the most part, critics argued that the provisions represented a covert effort at government 
rationing of health care
219 and an unjustified interference into the physician-patient 
relationship.
220  In the aftermath of ARRA, at least one member of Congress went so far 
                                                 
218 However, some criticism of ARRA’s CER provisions predated the passage of the law.  
See, e.g., Scott Gotlieb, Congress Wants to Restrict Drug Access, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 
2009, at A14. 
219 See, e.g., George F. Will, Stimulus Math for the GOP, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2009, at 
A19; Betsy McCaughey, GovernmentCare’s Assault on Seniors, WALL ST. J., July 23, 
2009, at A15 (“The assault against seniors began with the stimulus package in February. 
Slipped into the bill was substantial funding for comparative effectiveness research, 
which is generally code for limiting care based on the patient’s age.”); Betsey 
McCaughey, Ruin Your Health With The Obama Stimulus Plan, Bloomberg, Feb. 9, 2009 
(suggesting that ARRA’s investments in CER, in combination with its investments in 
health information technology, will result in the federal government monitoring 
“treatments to make sure your doctor is doing what the federal government 
deems appropriate and cost effective.”).  McCaughey’s claim, similar to one made by the 
Heritage Foundation a few days earlier, was also picked up by Rush Limbaugh.  See 
NINA OWCHARENKO, THE STIMULUS BILL:  WHY THE SENATE MUST FIX THE HEALTH 
CARE PROVISIONS (2009), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/02/the-stimulus-bill-why-the-senate-must-
fix-the-health-care-provisions; Rush Limbaugh, “The March To Socialized Medicine 
Starts In Obama’s Porkulus Bill,” 
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_020909/content/01125111.guest.html 
(last visited March 30, 2011).  
220 See OWCHARENKO, supra note 219. In May 2010, a Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of New York granted the government’s motion to dismiss a suit that 
argued, among other things, that the CER provisions of ARRA “lay[ed] the groundwork 
for a permanent government rationing board” and that the Coordinating Council would 
“prescribe what care, procedures or medications [plaintiffs] will receive in place of the 
doctors chosen by the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs themselves;” the Court noted that such  
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as to vote against the appointment of Kathleen Sibelius as the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services because of concerns related to CER.
221  On the surface, the strong 
negative reaction of some Republicans to the inclusion of CER in ARRA was somewhat 
surprising, both because the general idea of CER, if not the details, is relatively 
uncontroversial, and because a number of prominent Republicans, including 2008 
presidential candidate Senator John McCain, had formerly supported the research.
222  
Regardless, concerns over ARRA’s investment in CER were still simmering as Congress 
began in earnest to debate comprehensive reform of the health care system in mid-2009. 
Although the retrospective significance of ARRA’s investment in CER changed 
dramatically with the passage of the ACA in the spring of 2010, and any evidence on the 
impact of CER funded by ARRA on the health system is years away, some results and 
lessons from the legislation are available today.  In response to ARRA’s legislative 
mandate, the IOM released its report to Congress and the President on June 30, 2009.
223  
In its report, the IOM identified the 100 topics, based on stakeholder input, which should 
take priority in CER research, divided into four quartiles to indicate priority within the 
list as a whole.
224  The report also included “recommendations for a robust national CER 
enterprise,” in which the IOM advocated for a number of policy reforms that would 
facilitate an on-going prioritization, monitoring and evaluation process for federally-
                                                 
assertions were “completely unsupported by the statute.”  Heghmann v. Sibelius, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71965, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).   
221 Jane Zhang, Sen. Kyl Explains His Vote Against Sibelius, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2009, 
at. 
222 John K. Iglehart, The Political Fight Over Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1757, 1758 (2010).  AHRQ and its predecessor also had bipartisan support, 
although conservative support for the agency partially broke down during the 1990s.  See 
supra notes 173-183 and accompanying text. 
223IOM NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR CER, supra note 7. 
224 Id. at 3-12.  
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sponsored CER, with a high degree of transparency and public involvement.
225  The IOM 
also called for additional research into CER methods, improved data collection methods, 
increased capacity in the CER workforce, and a sustained effort to diffuse CER 
findings.
226   
On the same day that the IOM published its report, the Federal Coordinating 
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research
227 released its Report to the President 
and the Congress.
228  To gather information for the report, the Council held a series of 
“listening sessions,” in which a variety of stakeholders had an opportunity to provide 
testimony and comments on the subject of CER.
229  The comments generally focused on 
research prioritization, infrastructure development (including “human and scientific 
capital, organizational capacity, and data capacity”), research methodology, care delivery, 
knowledge transfer, cost, health disparities, and personalized medicine.
230  Notably, in its 
report, the Council focused on the “patient centered” aspect of CER,
231 which it 
suggested could help answer the question of “which therapeutic choice works best for 
                                                 
225 Id. at 140-146. 
226 Id. at 146-159. 
227 For the Council’s membership, see Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research Membership, 
http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/os/cerbios.html (last visited March 30, 2011).  
For summaries of the Council’s meetings pre-report meetings, see FEDERAL 
COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, supra note 228, at 59-64. 
228 FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS (2009), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/cerannualrpt.pdf. 
229 Summaries and transcripts from these listening sessions are available at Comparative 
Effectiveness Research Funding, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/index.html 
(last visited March 30, 2011). 
230 FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, supra note 228, at 53-59 (summarizing 
trends in the comments and testimony). 
231 For the Council’s definition of CER, see supra note 11.  
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whom, when, and in what circumstances” and help patients “take responsibility for their 
care.”
232  In a preview of how advocates for CER would frame the issue in the ACA, the 
report notes that CER can also be called “patient-centered health research or patient-
centered outcomes research to illustrate its focus on patient needs.”
233  The Council 
recommended that the Secretary of HHS spend ARRA’s $400 billion in discretionary 
funds primarily on data infrastructure, and then on “dissemination and translation of CER 
findings, priority populations, and priority types of interventions” secondarily.
234 
Congress required the three federal agencies to award the funds provided by 
September 30, 2010.
235  By August 2010, the federal government had allocated at least 
82.8 percent of the $1.1 billion in CER funding included in ARRA, although only half of 
that amount had already been awarded to specific grantees.
236  Of the amount allocated, 
roughly half was designated for “evidence development and synthesis activities.”
237  
Most of the rest went toward building CER capacity, approximately 7% was aimed at 
efforts to translate and disseminate evidence, and a total of approximately 5% was or will 
be spent to set priorities and engage stakeholders.
238 
3.  The ACA 
                                                 
232 Id. at 3. 
233 Id. at 4.  The Council identified several priority subpopulations, “including racial and 
ethnic minorities, individuals with disabilities, children, persons with multiple chronic 
conditions, and the elderly,” based on underrepresentation in previous research, increased 
disease burden, and health disparities.  Id. at 18. 
234 Id. at 44-48. 
235 Joshua S. Benner et al., An Evaluation Of Recent Federal Spending On Comparative 
Effectiveness Research:  Priorities, Gaps, And Next Steps, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1768, 1769 
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  Although ARRA’s investment in CER arguably set the stage for prominent 
inclusion of CER in Congress’ effort to reform the health care system,
239 it did not 
provide a clear picture of what a permanent expansion of federal CER efforts would look 
like.  When Congress shifted its primary focus toward health reform in the spring of 
2009, it became apparent that CER was one of the issues for which there was a difference 
of opinion between members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, in addition 
to the recently diverged positions on the issue held by members of Congress from the two 
major political parties.
240  One of the early major bills debated in the Senate, the 
“Affordable Health Choices Act” (also known as the “Senate HELP Committee bill” or 
the “Kennedy bill” due to Senator Kennedy’s role in forming the bill before his death 
later that year), included a “Center for Health Outcomes Research and Evaluation” within 
AHRQ.
241  Although the bill expressly provided that the Center’s “reports and 
recommendations [would] not be construed as mandates for payment, coverage, or 
treatment,”
242 the bill faced stiff opposition by Senate republicans.
243 
                                                 
239 While ARRA may have been the first major legislative step toward increased federal 
support for CER, as well as increased public scrutiny and political controversy for the 
issue, it is important to note that support for the research in Congress started with the 
Democratic take-over of Congress in 2007.  See Kavita Patel, Health Reform’s Tortuous 
Route To The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1777, 
1777-1778 (2009) (providing details about legislative efforts to support CER between 
2007 and 2009).  Patel notes that CER was supported in the platforms of both Barack 
Obama and John McCain during the 2008 election.  Id. at 1778. 
240 Id.  
241 S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 219 (2009). 
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243 Patel, supra note 239, at 1779 (noting that Sen. Mike Enzi (R-WY) suggested that the 
bill created “a new bureaucracy to dictate which treatments you pay for,” other 
Republicans compared the center to NICE in the United Kingdom, and Republican 
senators proposed more than twenty amendments to eliminate the center from the bill on 
the first day of its markup in the HELP Committee).  
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  The first major bill debated by the House was H.R. 3200, “America’s Affordable 
Health Choices Act of 2009.”
244  The bill included CER provisions
245 similar to those 
Democrats had sought (and failed) to include in one of the House’s versions of a 
reauthorization bill for the Children’s Health Insurance Program in 2007.
246  Like the 
Senate HELP bill, the bill’s Center for Comparative Effectiveness Research would have 
been located with AHRQ.
247  Although there was some dissent among the House 
Democrats about whether a fully public agency was the best way to support CER, they 
decided to commit to the model.
248  Thus, the health reform bill that ultimately passed by 
the House on November 7, 2009
249 (“House Bill”) called for a center within AHRQ “to 
conduct, support, and synthesize research . . . with respect to the outcomes, effectiveness, 
and appropriateness of health care services and procedures in order to identify the manner 
in which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can most effectively and 
appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, and managed clinically.”
250   
In contrast, the bill passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009
251 included the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (“PCORI”).
252  Senate Republicans 
opposed the PCORI, much as they had opposed the inclusion of CER in the HELP bill, 
and the United States Preventive Services Task Force amplified their concerns through its 
                                                 
244 H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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250 H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 1401(a) (2009). 
251 See Robert Pear, Senate Passes Health Care Overhaul on Party Line Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at A1. 
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release of revised breast cancer screening guidelines while the bill was still pending.
253 
Yet, the PCORI remained largely intact through the passage of the ACA and its 
amendment by the Reconciliation Act.   
  Section 6301 of the ACA creates the PCORI.
254  The statute provides that the 
purpose of the PCORI is “to assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in 
making informed health decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of evidence 
concerning the matter in which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can 
effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed 
through research and evidence synthesis that considers variations in patient 
subpopulations, and the dissemination of research findings with respect to the relative 
health outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of . . . medical 
treatments.”
255    
                                                 
253 See Patel, supra note 239, at 1780; Op-ed, Liberals and mammography, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 24, 2009, at A22 (“The flap over breast cancer screening has provided a fascinating 
insight into the political future of ObamaCare.  Specifically, the political left supports 
such medical rationing even as it disavows that any such thing is happening. . . . [T]he 
distinction between cost effectiveness and clinical effectiveness will be moot if 
ObamaCare passes. . . . Americans will simply have to accept that the price of 
government-run health care in the name of redistributive justice is that patients and their 
doctors must bow to the superior wisdom of HHS task forces.”).  In part, Democrats were 
able to assuage concerns related to the new guidelines by including a section in the ACA 
requiring group health insurance plans to cover mammography for women according to 
the most current guidelines other than the controversial guidelines of November 2009.  
ACA § 1001. 
254 This section will be codified in Title XI of the Social Security Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 
1301 et seq. (sections (a) and (d)), and 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1 (section (c)), section 937 of 
the Public Health services Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 299 et seq. (section (b)), and section 9511 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (sections (e) and (f)). 
255 ACA § 6301(a).  
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Toward this end, the law requires the PCORI to identify research priorities and 
project agenda, as well as to carry out its agenda through research.
256  Methodologically, 
the statute is flexible; while the statute provides for general methodological standards, the 
Institute may use a variety of research designs, including randomized trials, observational 
studies, systematic reviews, and any “other methodologies recommended by the 
methodology committee” established by the law, if adopted by the Board of the 
PCORI.
257  In order to conduct research, the statute authorizes the Institute to contract 
with other federal agencies as well as non-governmental entities that conduct research, 
although the Institute must give preference to contracts with the NIH or AHRQ.
258  To 
contract with the PCORI, a research entity must abide by the agency’s transparency, 
conflict of interest, methodological, privacy, and ethics requirements.
259  The entity must 
also allow its researchers to publish their findings in peer-reviewed “or other” 
publications, as long as each researcher has signed a data-use agreement with the PCORI 
and complies with the Institute’s general peer-review process for original research.
260  
The statute also grants researchers the flexibility to contract for the inclusion of payment 
                                                 
256 Congress accompanied this delegation of authority with the requirement that the 
PCORI consider a number of factors, including “disease incidence, prevalence, and 
burden . . . (with emphasis on chronic conditions), gaps in evidence . . . practice 
variations and health disparities . . . the potential for new evidence to improve patient 
health, well-being, and the quality of care.” ACA § 6301(a).  In addition, the Institute 
must also consider the effects of a “health care treatment, strategy, or health” condition 
on national expenditures.  Id.  With regard to the “patient-centered” aspect of the 
Institute’s mission, it must also take into account “patient needs, outcomes, and 
preference,” as well as relevance to decisionmakers.  Id.  
257 Id.   
258 Id. 
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of research participants’ insurance co-pays and co-insurance, when necessary.
261  
Significantly, the PCORI will have access to data collected by CMS through Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), in addition to any 
registries or databases that the PCORI assists in developing,
262 although in using this data 
the Institute remains bound by existing confidentiality and privacy laws.
263  Along with 
this access, however, is the requirement that the PCORI must periodically “review and 
update” its research.
264 
The PCORI has the general authority to appoint expert advisory panels to help set 
research priorities and agenda, and it must create such panels to advise the agency with 
regard to randomized clinical trials and rare diseases (to the extent the Institute 
undertakes studies of rare diseases).
265  The Institute must also create a methodology 
committee “to develop and improve the science and methods of comparative clinical 
effectiveness research” by updating “scientifically-based” methodological standards on 
“internal validity, generalizability, feasibility . . . timeliness of research . . . health 
outcomes measures, risk adjustment, and other relevant aspects of research and 
assessment.”
266  This Committee must consider input from stakeholders, experts, 
decisionmakers, and the public in developing its standards.
267 
For oversight, the PCORI is subject to annual financial audits, as well as less 
frequent audits of its “processes,” “dissemination and training activities and data 
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265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id.  
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networks,” its “overall effectiveness,” and the “adequacy and use” of its funds.
268  The 
PCORI must also provide a public comment period before the adoption of its list of 
research priorities, hold public forums, disclose research findings (including processes 
and methods), provide notice of public comment periods and publish the comments 
received during those periods, and also make public some of its proceedings.
269  In 
addition, the Institute is subject to conflict of interest disclosure requirements and a 
prohibition on gifts or donations.
270 
Beyond encouraging the publication of original research findings in peer-
reviewed journals, Congress also mandated that the PCORI make all research findings 
“available to clinicians, patients, and the general public.”
271  These findings must be 
available in a “manner that is comprehensible and useful to patients and providers in 
making health care decisions,” and must also “fully convey findings” related to the 
research’s applicability to subpopulations and its interaction with different risk factors.
272 
The Institute must also convey the limits of the research and discuss what further research 
may be necessary.
273  Notably, the PCORI may not include with its research findings 
“practice guidelines, coverage recommendations, payment, or policy 
recommendations.”
274 
To further encourage the diffusion of the results of the PCORI’s federally funded 
CER, Congress also charged the Office of Communication and Knowledge Transfer 
                                                 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id.  
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(“OCKT”) within AHRQ and the NIH with broad dissemination of the Institute’s 
research results and other federally sponsored CER.
275  The OCKT, specifically, must 
“create informational tools that organize and disseminate research findings for 
physicians, health care providers, patients, payers, and policy makers,” as well as 
“develop a publicly available resources database that collects and contains government-
funded evidence and research from public, private, not-for profit, and academic 
sources.”
276  In addition, the OCKT must assist in the “timely incorporation” of 
disseminated research findings into health information technology (“HIT”) clinical 
decision support tools.
277  The OCKT is also responsible for creating a process to receive 
feedback from health care providers, consumers, HIT vendors, and insurers on the 
“value” of the CER information it disseminates.
278  Meanwhile, AHRQ and the NIH have 
the responsibility of training researchers to “build capacity” to conduct CER that meets 
the methodological requirements of the PCORI, and Congress instructed the Secretary of 
HHS to coordinate relevant federal agencies in building CER data capacity, with the goal 
of creating and maintaining a “comprehensive, interoperable data network to collect, link, 
and analyze data on outcomes and effectiveness from multiple sources.”
279 
Unlike some provisions in the ACA,
280 Congress fully appropriated funds for the 
PCORI.  Section 6301(d) orders a fund transfer from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust 
                                                 
275 ACA § 6301(b). 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 See C. STEPHEN REDHEAD ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
DISCRETIONARY FUNDING IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
(2010) (describing the provisions of the ACA for which Congress authorized, but did not 
appropriate, funds).  
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Fund
281 and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund
282 to a “Patient-
Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund.”
283  For fiscal year 2013, the PCORI will 
receive one dollar times the average number of people “entitled to benefits” under 
Medicare Part A, or enrolled in the Medicare Part B program.
284  Then, in fiscal years 
2014 through 2019, the PCORI will receive two dollars times the average number of 
these beneficiaries.
285  The statute also provides for an adjustment in the event of an 
increase in national health expenditures.
286  In addition, Congress directly appropriated 
$10 million for fiscal year 2010, $50 million for fiscal year 2011, and $150 million for 
fiscal year 2012.
287  For fiscal years 2013 through 2019, the Institute will receive $150 
million plus the net revenues from an annual fee on health insurance and self-insurance
288 
plans.
289  Lastly, Congress established the PCORI as a tax-exempt government 
corporation under section 501(l) of the Internal Revenue Code.
290 
The controversial political climate surrounding CER exerted influence over the 
structure of PCORI in a number of ways.  First, to address concerns that the ACA’s use 
                                                 
281 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (2006). 
282 42 U.S.C. § 1395t (2006). 
283 ACA § 6301(d). 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 ACA § 6301(e). 
288 Self-insurance occurs when a (typically large) employer provides health “insurance” 
for its employees by paying for their health care costs.  Due to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”), self-insured employers avoid state insurance 
regulations.  See generally Jon R. Gabel et al, Self-Insurance In Times Of Growing And 
Retreating Managed Care, 22 HEALTH AFF. 202, 202-204 (2003). 
289 ACA § 6301(e)(1).  Section 6301(e)(2) imposes on each insurance or self-insurance 
policy a fee of $2 times “the average number of lives covered under the policy.” 
290 ACA § 6301(f).  
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of CER will mimic that of NICE in the United Kingdom,
291 the PCORI is prohibited from 
using Quality Adjusted Life-years (“QALYs”)
292 “as a threshold to determine what type 
of health care is cost effective or recommended . . .  [or] to determine coverage, 
reimbursement, or incentive programs.”
293  The statute also prohibits the Secretary of 
HHS from using CER findings to make Medicare coverage decisions “in a manner that 
treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower 
value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, non-disabled, or not 
terminally ill.”
294  The Secretary of HHS also may not use the findings “in a manner that 
precludes, or with the intent to discourage, an individual from choosing a health care 
treatment based on how the individual values the tradeoff between extending the length 
of their life and the risk of disability.”
295  Although Congress tempered these restrictions 
with provisions that allow Medicare coverage determinations to be informed by 
differences in comparative effectiveness between treatments with regard to extending life 
due to “age, disability, or terminal illness” or setting differential copayments “based on 
factors such as cost or type of service,”
296 the legislature clearly sought to send a strong 
message with regard to limits on federal use of CER findings. 
                                                 
291 Iglehart, supra note 222, at 1758 (“During US health care reform, QALYs quickly 
became more code language for government-run health care systems and rationing.”). 
292 “A QALY gives an idea of how many extra months or years of life of a reasonable 
quality a person might gain as a result of treatment.”  “Measuring Effectiveness and Cost 
Effectiveness:  the QALY,” 
http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/features/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenessth
eqaly.jsp (last visited March 30, 2011).  For more information, see generally Peter J. 
Neumann and Dan Greenberg, Is The United States Ready For QALYs?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 
1366 (2009). 
293 ACA § 6301(c), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(e). 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 Id.  
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  Second, to assuage fears about CER inhibiting medical treatment innovation,
297 
the 21-member board of PCORI must be filled with members from a set of stakeholder 
interest groups, including industry and researchers.
298  Industry lobbyists also 
successfully persuaded Congress to include a provision allowing the board to prohibit the 
agency from contracting with a researcher for at least five years if research published 
under a previous contract with PCORI was not “within the bounds of and entirely 
consistent with evidence and findings produced under the contract with the Institute.”
299  
Congress, however, struck this section from the final bill before it passed.
300 
  Third, a coalition of unions and employee advocates persuaded Congress to 
include a “real conflict of interest” disclosure requirement
301 for PCORI board 
members.
302  Section 6301 includes two defined conflict of interest terms.  Under the 
statute, a “conflict of interest” is “an association, including a financial or personal 
                                                 
297 Iglehart, supra note 222, at 1759. 
298 ACA § 6301(c), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(f).  The complete list of 
mandatory stakeholder membership includes the Directors of AHRQ and the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), three representatives of health care consumers, seven 
representatives of health care providers (including four physicians with at least one 
surgeon included in that group, one nurse, one integrative health are practitioner, and a 
hospital), three representatives of private payers (at least one representative of a health 
insurance issuer and one representative of a self-insured employer), three representatives 
of the pharmaceutical, device and diagnostic manufacturing industries, one representative 
of quality improvement or independent health service researchers, and two 
representatives of the federal or state governments, at least one of which must represent a 
federal health program or agency. 
299 Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 6301(a) (2010); see Harry P. Selker and Alastair J.J. 
Wood, Industry Influence on Comparative-Effectiveness Research Funded through 
Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2595, 2596 (2009) (“To allow scientists . . . 
to be punished for the publication of work that is not approved by this entity is essentially 
to cede authority over the dissemination of government-funded research to a body that is 
at least partially controlled by persons with a potential commercial interest in its 
outcome.”). 
300 Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10602(1)(B) (2010). 
301 ACA § 6301(c), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(f)(2).   
302 Iglehart, supra note 222, at 1759-1760.  
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association, that [has] the potential to bias or have the appearance of biasing an 
individual’s decisions in matters related to the Institute or the conduct of activities under” 
section 6301.
303  In contrast, a “real conflict of interest” is “any instance where a member 
of the Board, the methodology committee . . . or an advisory panel . . . or a close relative 
of such member, has received or could receive either . . . a direct financial benefit of any 
amount deriving from the result or findings of a study conducted under” section 6301 or 
“a financial benefit from individuals or companies that own or manufacture medical 
treatments, services, or items to be studied . . . that in the aggregate exceeds $10,000 per 
year” including “honoraria, fees, stock, or other financial benefit and the current value of 
the member or close relative’s already existing stock holdings, in addition to any direct 
financial benefit deriving from the results or findings of a” PCORI study.
304 
  Fourth, section 6301 includes rules of construction that make it clear the Institute 
may not “mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private 
payer” or prevent “the Secretary [of HHS] from covering the routine costs of clinical care 
received by” Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP beneficiaries.
305  Further, the Secretary of 
HHS may only use the PCORI’s research findings to make Medicare coverage 
determinations after an “iterative and transparent process which includes public comment 
and considers the effect on subpopulations,”
306 and section 6301 does not alter the 
coverage of “reasonable and necessary” treatments or allow the Secretary to deny 
coverage “solely on the basis of” CER.
307 
                                                 
303 ACA § 6301(a). 
304 Id. 
305 ACA § 6301(a). 
306 ACA § 6301(c). 
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  In the fall of 2010, the Comptroller General appointed 19 members to the PCORI 
Board.
308  The Board met once in 2010, and plans to meet six times in 2011, in locations 
throughout the United States.
309  The PCORI has also established a Program 
Development Committee,
310 a Public Affairs and Communications Committee,
311 and a 
Methodological Committee.
312  Thus, it remains too early to discern the agencies initial 
actions and priorities, although the findings of the IOM and the Federal Coordinating 
Council reports ordered by ARRA
313 may provide some limited hints about the agency’s 
future direction. 
IV.  Opportunities and Challenges for the Future 
  Although the significant investments in CER included in ARRA and the ACA 
present an important opportunity to facilitate CER through carefully designed 
involvement by the federal government, the path forward is sure to include a number of 
challenges.  Some of those challenges are technical.  Existing CER infrastructure is 
fragmented,
314 the government does not currently have a database that would provide a 
systematic way for researchers and the public to access federal CER studies, and it is thus 
                                                 
308 For the current membership of the Board, see U.S. GAO – Current Membership of the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) Governing Board, 
http://www.gao.gov/about/hcac/pcori_members.html (last visited March 30, 2011). 
309 See Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute Meetings, 
http://www.pcori.org/meetings.html (last visited March 30, 2011). 
310 See PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT TO PCORI (2011), available at 
http://pcori.org/images/PDC_Report_03-07-2011.pdf. 
311 See PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.pcori.org/images/PACC_Report_03-08-2011.pdf. 
312 See REPORT FROM THE METHODOLOGY COMMITTEE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
(2011), available at http://www.pcori.org/images/MC_Report_03-08-2011.pdf. 
313 See supra section III(b)(2). 
314 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 
supra note 228, at 33.  
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not even clear how many of such studies exist.
315  Commentators have called for the 
creation of a universal, standardized database to include all clinical trial and research data 
sets, including a rapid-learning, open database for CER studies,
316 and a National Patient 
Library to make available to the public the results of federally funded CER.
317  A 
clearinghouse for information about federal investment in CER would also be helpful to 
ensure that spending matches identified priorities and goals.
318  Regardless of its form, it 
is clear that some sort of centralized database that organizes and provides access to 
information about sponsored CER studies and their results will be a necessary first step 
toward measuring the success of the government’s initiatives and disseminating research 
results. 
  Other challenges will be methodological and evidentiary.  Although the ACA 
requires the PCORI’s methodological standard to “provide specific criteria for internal 
validity, generalizability, feasibility, and timeliness,” this standard governs the research 
and analysis itself.
319  In contrast, an evidentiary standard would govern the decision 
about what type of study (such as a controlled trial) to require of sponsored studies.
320  
Because there are several ways to conduct CER, including systematic reviews of existing 
evidence, meta-analyses, experimental studies (including randomized control trials), and 
                                                 
315 FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 
supra note 228, at 29 (noting that while AHRQ tracks its funding and studies, there is no 
standard way to identify CER funded through the NIH).  For a chart of existing research 
“person-level” research databases within the federal government, see id. at 64-68. 
316 Etheredge, supra note 104, at 1763-1764. 
317 Jeffrey C. Lerner et al., The Case For A National Patient Library, 29 HEALTH AFF. 
1914 (2010). 
318 Benner, supra note 235, at 1774. 
319 Garrison et al., supra note 15, at 1816. 
320 Id.  For a general overview of some methods of conducting CER, see 2007 CBO 
REPORT, supra note 84, at 20-25.  
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non-experimental studies (including retrospective and prospective observational 
studies),
321 this is not necessarily a simple decision.
322  Although randomized clinical 
trials are the most rigorous form of research, they are expensive and time consuming, and 
their traditional form may require some modification to become more suitable for 
CER.
323  In addition, it will be necessary to establish realistic expectations for the 
timeline and costs of CER, regardless of which research methods the PCORI endorses.  
Because CER studies may need to have large sample sizes in order to produce significant 
results about different types of patients, and it may take a long time to fully observe 
important long-term outcomes, CER may be more costly and time-consuming than other 
forms of research.
324  In order to fully evaluate the success of the PCORI, it will be 
important to balance the need for aggressive efforts to generate research findings as 
quickly as possible with realistic expectations about the time needed to achieve high 
quality results. 
The PCORI, and the range of entities that are likely to use its research, will also 
have to decide whether to set an evidentiary standard for sponsored CER.  The FDA, for 
example, requires “substantial evidence,” typically based on at least two major double-
                                                 
321 Nancy A. Dreyer et al., Why Observational Studies Should Be Among The Tools Used 
In Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1818, 1818 (2010). 
322 See Dreyer, supra note 321, at 1820-1822 (proposing “criteria for determining which 
type of study to employ” in different circumstances); see also Rachael L. Fleurence at al., 
The Critical Role Of Observational Evidence In Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1826 (2010) (comparing the benefits and flaws in observational studies and 
randomized trials); Elshaug and Garber, supra note 49, at 1392 (noting that well-designed 
observational studies have potential to generate information about subgroups excluded 
from clinical trials, although randomized trials remain important under certain 
circumstances). 
323 See generally Bryan R. Luce et al., Rethinking Randomized Clinical Trials for 
Comparative Effectiveness Research:  The Need for Transformational Change, 151 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 206 (2009). 
324 McClellan and Benner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 9.  
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blind and randomized trials (or one with supporting evidence in some circumstances) to 
approve a new drug or biological,
325 and a similar standard applies to comparative-
effectiveness claims about such products.
326  Other standards apply to other products, and 
the applicable evidentiary standard, in practice, has depended on “the novelty of the 
product, the medical need for new therapies for the target condition, and what is known 
about the product’s effectiveness relative to its risks,” with lower standards applied to 
treatments that have potential to serve an important unmet need, and higher standards 
applied to products that seem comparable to approved products or that have an uncertain 
safety profile.
327  Even for agencies like the FDA, however, that have relatively strict and 
clear evidentiary standards, expert judgment is still necessarily used to evaluate the 
evidence.
328  One set of authors has recommended that the PCORI qualify its research by 
describing its “relative value” based on an estimation of the value of more research on the 
subject.
329  Regardless of what standard that the PCORI adopts, the credibility of research 
findings disseminated by the agency would be bolstered by the use of a consistent 
                                                 
325 Garrison et al., supra note 15, at 1813. 
326 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(ii) (defining false and misleading advertisements to 
include comparative claims not supported by “substantial evidence” or “substantial 
clinical experience”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006) (section 505 of the Food Drug 
and Cosmetic Act, which defines “substantial evidence” as “evidence consisting of 
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug 
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such 
experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the 
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed 
labeling thereof”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (defining “adequate and well-controlled studies” 
for the purpose of determining whether a claim of efficacy is supported by “substantial 
evidence” under section 505 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); 21 C.F.R. § 
202.1(e)(4)(ii)(c) (defining “substantial clinical experience”). 
327 Garrison et al., supra note 15, at 1814. 
328 Id., at 1815. 
329 Id., at 1814.  
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measure qualifying the strength of new evidence.
330  Such a standard would assist 
providers and consumers in evaluating whether to change their current practices, and 
would provide important context for the new findings. 
An additional issue facing the PCORI and other efforts to expand CER is research 
capacity.  A recent study found that the United States has “little or no excess capacity” to 
conduct additional clinical trials, based on constraints in the supply of both patients and 
investigators.
331  Thus, any expansion in clinical trial-based CER is likely to require the 
diversion of resources from other research, expanded research capacity through improved 
efficiency, or increased incentives for investigators and participants to engage in CER.
332  
Existing health information privacy rules are also likely to make it difficult to conduct 
CER using existing patient data (for example, information included in electronic health 
records),
333 although some databases of patient-level information to be used for 
observational studies do exist.
334  In this way, evolving privacy rules and standards for 
the use of patient information aggregated through health information technology will play 
a key role in the future of CER. 
                                                 
330 See Cynthia D. Mulrow and Kathleen N. Lohr, Proof and Policy from Medical 
Research Evidence, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 249, 254-259 (2001). 
331 Robert B. Griffin and Janet Woodcock, Comparative Effectiveness Research:  Who 
Will Do The Studies, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2075, 2076, 2078 (2010) (arguing for the creation 
of a “federally funded national research infrastructure” that would “provide a mechanism 
for community-based clinicians to participate in clinical trials” in a less burdensome way 
and would “reduce the redundancy and inefficiency intrinsic to the ‘cottage industry’ 
nature of the clinical research process.”).  
332 Id. 
333 See generally Douglas Peddicord et al., A Proposal To Protect Privacy Of Health 
Information While Accelerating Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 
2082 (2010). 
334 See, e.g., Wilson D. Pace et al., An Electronic Practice-Based Network for 
Observational Comparative Effectiveness Research, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 338 
(2009) (describing the AHRQ-funded Distributed Ambulatory Research in Therapeutics 
Network).  
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  What is likely to be more challenging than technical and methodological issues, 
however, will be difficulties associated with realizing the much-touted benefits of CER, 
including cost control,
335 through widespread adoption of the research’s results by health 
care providers and consumers.
336  Although some federal agencies that conducted CER 
before ARRA and the ACA have sought to translate their studies into usable information 
for health care patients and providers,
337 outside of the agencies that conduct research in 
                                                 
335 See McClellan and Benner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 14 (linking 
cost control with goals of conducting “high value” research, developing a “robust 
research infrastructure,” and creating mechanisms “to promote the appropriate use of new 
evidence in clinical practice and health policy in a timely way”). 
336 In the face of this problem, a new field, “implementation science,” which is the study 
of methods to promote incorporation of research findings and evidence-based medicine 
into real-world practice, has emerged.  See generally Ann C. Bonham and Mildred Z. 
Solomon, Moving Comparative Effectiveness Research Into Practice:  Implementation 
Science And The Role Of Academic Medicine, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1901, 1902-1903 (2010).  
Early information from this science suggests four important considerations for the 
purpose of information dissemination:  “the characteristics of the intervention will 
influence whether clinicians and patients adopt and sustain a new practice. . . . the mind-
set of people who are expected to implement the new practice is critical . . . . the context 
in which clinicians practice shapes their willingness and ability to adopt new practices . . . 
[and] the process by which change is implemented can determine whether it is 
successful.” Atkins, infra note 345, at 1908.  Thus, factors including the strength of the 
evidence, its degree of “relative advantage” in terms of time, ease, or profitability, local 
culture, patient expectations, support for providers changing practice, and the use of a 
consensus-building process can affect the adoption of the information.  Id.  “Making it 
easy to do the right thing” thus becomes critically important.  Id. at 1911.  See also Naik 
and Petersen, supra note 199, at 1931 (calling for an “implementation research and 
development program” to “accelerate the translation of evidence into everyday care, 
enhance the opportunities for doctors and patients to define value . . . on the basis of their 
understanding of local contexts and constraints, and allow providers and patients to 
communicate with researchers and policymakers about clinically important issues earlier 
in the research process.”). 
337 For example, AHRQ publishes a number of guides on its website that provide 
summaries of, and recommendations related to, CER studies, and also partners with 
professional societies, non-profit organizations, and patient advocacy groups to 
disseminate its findings.  See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, supra note 228, at 35;   
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connection with directly providing care (like the VHA),
338 dissemination and adoption 
remain a challenge.
339   
In order to ensure that the results of subsidized comparative effectiveness studies 
reach their target audiences, it is important to incorporate dissemination plans into study 
design.
340  Furthermore, to permanently improve channels for the diffusion of new 
comparative effectiveness information, it may also be helpful to improve continuing 
education programs for health care providers,
341 incorporate the information into health 
information technology systems,
342 and to address marketing for medical treatments.
343  
As discussed above, publicly available library of CER results could also help disseminate 
new information to health care providers and consumers.
344  Regardless of how the 
PCORI or other entities seek to diffuse CER information, however, it is crucial that the 
information disseminated is relevant to the needs of consumers and providers, in terms of 
its applicable populations and settings, its comparison to relevant alternative treatments, 
                                                 
338 FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH, 
supra note 228, at 35; see, e.g., AHRQ:  Comparing Medical Treatments subdirectory, 
http://www.ahrq.gov/consumer/compare.html (last visited March 30, 2011).  The Center 
for Disease Control (“CDC”), the DoD, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, the FDA, the Office of Public Health and Science, Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, and the Health Resources and Services 
Administration are also involved, to various degrees, in efforts to disseminate research 
findings.  See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS 
RESEARCH, supra note 228, at 36-38. 
339 See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text. 
340 Avorn, supra note 22, at 1895. 
341 See Bonham and Solomon, supra note 336, at 1903 (advocating for academic 
medicine to play an active role in pushing for the dissemination of CER results). 
342 Atkins, infra note 345, at 1908. 
343 Avorn, supra note 22, at 1896. 
344 See Lerner, supra note 317.  
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and its consideration of patient preferences.
345  It is also likely to be much easier to 
diffuse CER results when those results are published before widespread adoption of a 
new technology,
346 so it will be important for the PCORI to time its studies of new 
technologies aggressively. 
In addition to delays associated with inertia and challenges associated with 
disseminating information among a large and diverse population, to the extent that 
economic incentives either discourage or do not facilitate rapid adoption, diffusion will 
be all the more difficult.  Economic incentives favoring the diffusion of CER findings 
could derive from the inclusion of research findings in private insurance coverage 
design
347 or through incorporation into the Medicare or Medicaid coverage rules.
348  
Because the ACA includes strict limits on how the Secretary of HHS may use CER to 
inform Medicare coverage for specific treatments,
349 however, widespread consideration 
of CER results in insurance coverage design may proceed more slowly than if Medicare 
were to have authority to lead the way more forcefully.   
  Even before the passage of the ACA, the structure of Medicare (and Medicaid, to 
a lesser extent) was not conducive to the inclusion of CER in coverage decisions.  
                                                 
345 See David Atkins et al., The Veterans Affairs Experience:  Comparative Effectiveness 
Research In A Large Health System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1906, 1907-1908 (2010). 
346 Alexander and Stafford, supra note 22, at 2488; see also Elshaug and Garber, supra 
note 49, at 1392. 
347 See generally James C. Robinson, Comparative Effectiveness Research:  From 
Clinical Information To Economic Incentives, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1788 (2010) (describing 
the mechanisms by which private insurers could incorporate CER into their plans). 
348 See Steven D. Pearson and Peter B. Bach, How Medicare Could Use Comparative 
Effectiveness Research In Deciding On New Coverage And Reimbursement, 29 HEALTH 
AFF. 1796 (2010). 
349 ACA § 6301(c).  Notably, the statute “does not discourage researchers from 
measuring QALYs or other comprehensive health outcome metrics.”  Alan M. Garber 
and Harold C. Sox, The Role Of Costs In Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 1805, 1807 (2010).  
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Medicare is statutorily required to cover only “reasonable and necessary” treatments,
350 a 
standard which does necessarily include comparative or cost effectiveness information.
351  
An effort in 2000 to publish a rule that would require new covered treatments to “add 
value” failed.
352  Furthermore, most Medicare coverage decisions are made on a local 
level,
353 and because of the program’s prospective payment system, Medicare does not 
make an explicit coverage determination for most treatments.
354  In combination with the 
fact that Medicare payment rates for a given treatment are roughly cost-based,
355 use of 
                                                 
350 Social Security Act § 1862, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2006).  The test used in 
local coverage determinations asks whether a treatment is:  (1) “safe and effective; (2) not 
experimental or investigational;” and (3) “appropriate” (i.e. “furnished in accordance 
with accepted standards of medical practice, furnished in an appropriate setting, ordered 
or furnished by qualified personnel, able to meet but . . .not exceed, the patient’s medical 
needs, [and] at least as beneficial as an existing and available medically appropriate 
alternative.” JOST, supra note 168, at 212.  In theory, these decisions are supposed to be 
based on published studies that included randomized control trials or “other definitive 
study methodologies,” but in practice, factors such as the medical standard of care or 
consensus play a role when such studies are not available.  Id. at 212-213.  CMS uses a 
different process for national coverage decisions, but this process lacks clear written 
criteria.  Id. at 214-219.  See generally Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost:  
Medicare Decisions, Transparency and Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2011) 
(criticizing the national coverage decision process); see also id. at 8 (noting that although 
CMS does not have authority to decline to cover a treatment due to its cost, the fact that 
Medicare operates within a budget set by Congress and Congress must raise revenue to 
cover increased costs “creates an incentive for CMS to control cost without appearing to 
violate the law, and provides Congress with an incentive to loosely examine CMS's cost-
saving decisions”). 
351 Pearson and Bach, supra note 348, at 1196-197 (noting the fragmented ways by which 
the federal government makes Medicare coverage decisions: a single national decision, “a 
series of separate determinations made by the medical directors of independent 
contractors in different regions of the country,” through a Congressional mandate, or by 
non-governmental third parties). 
352 2007 CBO REPORT, supra note 84, at 31-32. 
353 See generally JOST, supra note 168, at 212-213. 
354 See generally id. at 210. 
355 Pearson and Bach, supra note 348, at 1798.  
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CER by CMS to create economic incentives favoring evidence-based care is quite 
limited.
356   
Thus, when the existing Medicare coverage regime is combined with the limits 
created by the ACA, it becomes clear that a fundamental redesign would be necessary to 
fully encourage and support use of comparative effectiveness information by health care 
providers who participate in the Medicare program.
357  Because of the roles states play in 
administering the Medicaid program, universal incorporation of CER results into that 
program would be complex as well.
358  At least in the near term, the lack of political will 
for such redesign is likely to be a barrier.  A 2010 public opinion poll found that while 
Americans strongly support use of CER to provide additional information to support 
medical decisionmaking, only approximately half of those polled supported use of 
comparative-effectiveness information to determine public and private insurance 
coverage for treatments, and more than sixty percent of respondents opposed using the 
information to charge patients more for choosing treatments found to be comparatively 
ineffective.
359  In combination with a 2009 poll in which respondents found arguments 
against the use of evidence-based treatment guidelines to be more persuasive than 
                                                 
356 See Pearson and Bach, supra note 348, at 1797-1798 (describing Medicare “coverage” 
and “reimbursement” as “separate silos” that “demonstrate the arcane complexity of 
decades of ad hoc updates with no fundamental redesign.”). 
357 See, e.g., id. at 1798-1800 (proposing a reform to Medicare whereby coverage and 
reimbursement determinations would be made based on categorizing a new treatment as 
having “superior effectiveness,” “comparable effectiveness” or “insufficient evidence”); 
see also 2007 CBO REPORT, supra note 84, at 31; Orszag, supra note 91, at 18-19. 
358 Orszag, supra note 91, at 19-20. 
359 Alan S. Gerber et al., The Public Wants Information, Not Board Mandates, From 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1872, 1874-1875 (2010).  
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arguments in favor of the guidelines,
360 this underscores the reality that even though the 
PCORI survived the political battle over the ACA, political challenges are likely to play a 
continuing role in the use of CER resulting from the law.   
Furthermore, even if the federal government found a politically feasible way to tie 
Medicare reimbursement with the findings of CER, it is far from clear that this would 
result in overall cost savings in the program.  Due to the ability of health care providers to 
offset decreases in fees through increased volume, known as “supplier induced demand” 
or the “volume response hypothesis,”
361 savings resulting from CER might be offset by 
increased expenditures in other areas.
362  Even absent this effect, it can take a long time to 
conduct, analyze, and disseminate the findings of CER, and any significant cost savings 
resulting from CER are likely to be at least a decade away.
363  Thus, political support for 
the research is likely to unravel if solely based on the prospect of cost savings, and 
particularly near-term cost savings.  Yet, based on the experiences of the governments of 
                                                 
360 Alan S. Gerber et al., A National Survey Reveals Public Skepticism About Research-
based Treatment Guidelines, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1882 (2010) (finding that the most support 
for the statement that “no outside group should come between doctors and patients in 
making treatment decisions”). 
361 See generally Morris L. Barer et al., Fee Controls as Cost Control:  Tales from the 
Frozen North, 66 MILIBANK Q. 1, 38-46 (1988); see also Miriam J. Laugesen, Siren 
Song:  Physicians, Congress, and Medicare Fees, 34 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 157, 
162-164 (2009) (describing the historical interaction between this characteristic of 
physician reimbursement and Medicare policy). 
362 See also Elshaug and Garber, supra note 49, at 1392 (noting that some of the savings 
associated with CER might be reduced if providers replace discredited treatments with 
other costly treatments). 
363 2007 CBO REPORT, supra note 84, at 30; see also Orszag, supra note 91, at 16 
(“Getting to the point where additional research on comparative effectiveness could have 
a noticeable impact on health spending would itself take several years. . . . Initially, the 
available results would probably address a relative small number of medical treatments 
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amassed.  And in areas of medicine that involve significant levels of spending, several 
studies could be needed before a consensus emerged about the appropriate conclusions to 
be drawn – even if those studies did not generate conflicting results.”).  
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other countries that have funded CER,
364 if the PCORI survives, pressure may mount for 
the agency to explicitly consider cost information in addition to comparative 
effectiveness, 
As was seen in the controversy surrounding the AHCPR in the 1990s,
365 any 
attempt to combine health care research and policy efforts can be politically hazardous.  
While the ACA ostensibly did not provide the PCORI with general policymaking 
authority, the inherent policy implications of CER that pervade section 6301 suggest that 
the PCORI may face similar challenges.  Observers have noted that the AHCPR faced 
political opposition both because there was a high risk that it would fail to meet high, and 
“arguably naïve,” expectations, and because it tackled issues related to the distribution of 
health care dollars, which created political enemies of the endeavor.
366  Moreover, close 
identification with a president’s health policy agenda, while demonstrating an agency’s 
relevance, can also foster political opposition.
367  Lastly, in order for a health research 
agency to remain viable, it must have a relatively stable constituency of supporters to 
lobby the political branches on its behalf, which is challenging for forms of research, like 
CER, that are not well understood and do not necessarily have as discrete a group of 
supporters as, for example, cancer research conducted through the NIH.
368   
The PCORI is likely to encounter these same problems.  While proponents of 
CER are right to point to the research’s vast potential to improve health care quality and 
perhaps lower costs, achieving those goals is sure to be challenging.  Particularly with 
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regard to CER’s potential to lower costs, it is naïve to imagine that the PCORI, or any 
other public or private entity, will alone be able to offer a solution when so many others 
have failed.  Health care cost control is a distributional issue, and in order to save 
taxpayers and private payers money, someone, whether drug and device manufacturers, 
physicians, hospitals, or insurance companies, will have to lose money.
369  This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that the benefits of CER accrue to the entire population, while 
the costs are highly concentrated among a discrete group of stakeholders.
370  Thus, if the 
political will to resist pressure from powerful financial stakeholders is absent, there is 
little reason to imagine that the PCORI’s research will have much cost-saving effect.  
Yet, because of the lofty expectations placed upon the agency and the idea of CER, this 
failure is likely to contribute to political arguments against the PCORI.  That is to say that 
CER proponent’s unrealistic claims about the research’s potential may not be doing the 
issue any favors.  Furthermore, the fact that the PCORI will be closely tied, at least for 
the foreseeable future, with a controversial health reform law, is also likely to contribute 
to the agency’s political fragility. 
It is worth re-emphasizing that the survival of the PCORI hinges on its ability to 
achieve the overt support of those who have potential to benefit from its research, which 
is anyone who uses health care products and services.  To reach these constituents, 
however, the agency will have to expand public understanding of CER, as well as work 
to dispel fears about the research interfering with the physician-patient relationship or 
unduly influencing insurance benefits.  Even if the PCORI is successful in increasing its 
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public support, however, it is unclear whether any level of broad public support could 
overcome the concentrated opposition of a smaller group of financial stakeholders.  The 
results of the PCORI’s CER studies thus may not be enough to have a significant impact 
on rising health care costs in the United States absent additional major reform of the 
health care system.   
The arguments in favor of government support for CER are robust.  While private 
efforts to compare medical treatments are important and should be encouraged, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the private sector alone is well suited to meet the 
informational needs of the health care system as a whole.  Not only are private efforts 
likely to be fragmented, duplicative and of limited accessibility to the general public,
371 
but they have so far left most medical treatments unevaluated.
372  This tracks the reality 
that CER is a public good, for which the government can play an important role in 
increasing the supply to an efficient level.
373 
Yet, some criticisms of CER have served a constructive purpose in ensuring that 
advocates are not blind to problems associated with the research.  Concerns about the 
interaction between CER and personalized medicine,
374 for example, may have 
contributed to the ACA’s conception of the research as helping to identify which 
treatments work best for which groups of patients under which circumstances, rather than 
pure head-to-head comparisons that may miss important nuances in treatment 
suitability.
375  Moreover, while it can be frustrating for those who believe in the potential 
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  75 
of CER to control costs that Congress has imposed such high barriers to the incorporation 
of research findings into the design of public insurance programs, those barriers may 
serve to decrease the harm that might be caused by premature adoption of uncertain 
research findings.
376  Finally, in the words of former Congressional Budget Office 
Director Peter Orszag, “moving the nation toward” a future of lower health care costs and 
better outcomes “will inevitably be an iterative process in which policy steps are tried, 
evaluated, and reconsidered.”
377  Thoughtful analysis and criticism of the government’s 
CER endeavors plays an important role in that process. 
Ultimately, perhaps the most valuable aspect of the federal government’s recent 
investment in CER is its potential to alter the norms surrounding medical innovation.  
While innovation in medical treatments is crucially important to efforts to improve both 
health and health care services in the United States, innovation itself has no inherent 
value.  Rather, the value of medical innovation comes from its ability to offer 
improvement relative to the status quo.
378  Of course, some failure, both in the form of 
treatments that do not work and treatments that are less effective than alternatives, is 
inherent to the process of medical innovation.  The answer to that aspect of innovation is 
not to allow less effective innovations to indefinitely remain part of standard medical 
                                                 
and potentially problematic to implement recommendations based on its results. CER's 
usefulness depends on a fairly sophisticated level of understanding regarding the meaning 
of its results and how to use that information. It may be that this complexity is what raises 
such significant public concerns. . . . The challenge with the information available from 
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practice, but to continuously study and refine our ideas about which treatments work best 
under what circumstances, and then to act on that knowledge. 
Thus, rightly or wrongly, the number of drugs and devices that can meet the 
FDA’s market entry requirements provides an incomplete picture of the state of medical 
innovation, and fails to alone incentivize the type of innovation that will move health care 
in the United States forward.  In this way, even if the PCORI is unable to unilaterally 
transform the United States health care system by enforcing adherence to evidence-based 
best practices, it may succeed in transforming and improving the standards to which new 
medical treatments are held, even if the new standards are not firmly binding.  To the 
extent that individuals and institutions are willing to use the data and information 
provided by the PCORI to hold medicine to standards that are both higher and better 
aligned with patient interests, then the ACA’s experiment with enhanced federal support 
for CER will have been a success.   